Detecting RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP) Session DesynchronizationFastlyAmsterdamNetherlandsjob@fastly.comRIPE NCCAmsterdamNetherlandstdekock@ripe.net
OPS
sidropsdesynchronizationRPKIRRDP
This document describes an approach for Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Relying Parties to detect a particular form of RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP) session desynchronization and how to recover.
This document updates RFC 8182.
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Table of Contents
. Introduction
. Requirements Language
. Immutability of RRDP Files
. Detection of Desynchronization
. Example
. Recovery After Desynchronization
. Changes to RFC 8182
. Security Considerations
. IANA Considerations
. References
. Normative References
. Informative References
Acknowledgements
Authors' Addresses
Introduction
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP) is a one-way synchronization protocol for distributing RPKI data in the form of differences (deltas) between sequential repository states.
Relying Parties (RPs) apply a contiguous chain of deltas to synchronize their local copy of the repository with the current state of the remote Repository Server.
Delta files for any given session_id and serial number are expected to contain an immutable record of the state of the Repository Server at that given point in time, but this is not always the case.
This document describes an approach for RPs to detect a form of RRDP session desynchronization where the hash of a delta for a given serial number and session_id have mutated from the previous Update Notification File and how to recover.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14
when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
Immutability of RRDP Files describes how discrete publication events such as the addition, modification, or deletion of one or more repository objects can be communicated as immutable files, highlighting advantages for publishers, such as the ability to precalculate files and make use of caching infrastructure.
Even though the global RPKI is understood to present a loosely
consistent view that depends on the cache's timing of updates (see
), different caches having different data for
the same RRDP session at the same serial violates the principle of
least astonishment.
If an RRDP server over time serves differing data for a given session_id and serial number, distinct RP instances (depending on the moment they connected to the RRDP server) would end up with divergent local repositories.
Comparing only the server-provided session_id and latest serial number across distinct RP instances would not bring such divergence to light.
The RRDP specification alludes to immutability being a property of RRDP files, but it doesn't make it clear that immutability is an absolute requirement for the RRDP to work well.
Detection of Desynchronization
Relying Parties can implement a mechanism to keep a record of the serial and hash attribute values in delta elements of the previous successful fetch of an Update Notification File.
Then, after fetching a new Update Notification File, the Relying Party should compare if the serial and hash values of previously seen serials match those in the newly fetched file.
If any differences are detected, this means that the Delta files were unexpectedly mutated, and the RP should proceed to .
Example
This section contains two versions of an Update Notification File to demonstrate an unexpected mutation.
The initial Update Notification File is as follows:
<notification xmlns="http://www.ripe.net/rpki/rrdp" version="1"
session_id="fe528335-db5f-48b2-be7e-bf0992d0b5ec" serial="1774">
<snapshot uri="https://rrdp.example.net/1774/snapshot.xml"
hash=
"4b5f27b099737b8bf288a33796bfe825fb2014a69fd6aa99080380299952f2e2"
/>
<delta serial="1774" uri="https://rrdp.example.net/1774/delta.xml"
hash=
"effac94afd30bbf1cd6e180e7f445a4d4653cb4c91068fa9e7b669d49b5aaa00"
/>
<delta serial="1773" uri="https://rrdp.example.net/1773/delta.xml"
hash=
"731169254dd5de0ede94ba6999bda63b0fae9880873a3710e87a71bafb64761a"
/>
<delta serial="1772" uri="https://rrdp.example.net/1772/delta.xml"
hash=
"d4087585323fd6b7fd899ebf662ef213c469d39f53839fa6241847f4f6ceb939"
/>
</notification>
Based on the above Update Notification File, an RP implementation could record the following state:
fe528335-db5f-48b2-be7e-bf0992d0b5ec
1774 effac94afd30bbf1cd6e180e7f445a4d4653cb4c91068fa9e7b669d49b5aaa00
1773 731169254dd5de0ede94ba6999bda63b0fae9880873a3710e87a71bafb64761a
1772 d4087585323fd6b7fd899ebf662ef213c469d39f53839fa6241847f4f6ceb939
A new version of the Update Notification File is published as follows:
<notification xmlns="http://www.ripe.net/rpki/rrdp" version="1"
session_id="fe528335-db5f-48b2-be7e-bf0992d0b5ec" serial="1775">
<snapshot uri="https://rrdp.example.net/1775/snapshot.xml"
hash=
"cd430c386deacb04bda55301c2aa49f192b529989b739f412aea01c9a77e5389"
/>
<delta serial="1775" uri="https://rrdp.example.net/1775/delta.xml"
hash=
"d199376e98a9095dbcf14ccd49208b4223a28a1327669f89566475d94b2b08cc"
/>
<delta serial="1774" uri="https://rrdp.example.net/1774/delta.xml"
hash=
"10ca28480a584105a059f95df5ca8369142fd7c8069380f84ebe613b8b89f0d3"
/>
<delta serial="1773" uri="https://rrdp.example.net/1773/delta.xml"
hash=
"731169254dd5de0ede94ba6999bda63b0fae9880873a3710e87a71bafb64761a"
/>
</notification>
Using its previously recorded state (see ), the RP can compare the hash values for serials 1773 and 1774.
For serial 1774, compared to the earlier version of the Update Notification File, a different hash value is now listed, meaning an unexpected delta mutation occurred.
Recovery After Desynchronization
Following the detection of RRDP session desynchronization, in order to return to a synchronized state, RP implementations SHOULD issue a warning and SHOULD download the latest Snapshot File and process it as described in .
See for an overview of risks associated with desynchronization.
Changes to RFC 8182
The following paragraph is added to , "Processing the Update Notification File", after the paragraph that ends "The Relying Party MUST then download and process the Snapshot File specified in the downloaded Update Notification File as described in Section 3.4.3."
NEW
If the session_id matches the last known session_id, the Relying Party SHOULD compare whether hash values associated with previously seen files for serials match the hash values of the corresponding serials in the newly fetched Update Notification File.
If any differences are detected, this means that files were unexpectedly mutated (see [RFC9697]).
The Relying Party SHOULD then download and process the Snapshot File specified in the downloaded Update Notification File as described in Section .
Security Considerations
Due to the lifetime of RRDP sessions (often measured in months), desynchronization can persist for an extended period if undetected.
Caches in a desynchronized state pose a risk by emitting a different set of Validated Payloads than they would otherwise emit with a consistent repository copy.
Through the interaction of the desynchronization and the failed fetch mechanism described in , Relying Parties could spuriously omit Validated Payloads or emit Validated Payloads that the Certification Authority intended to withdraw.
As a result, due to the desynchronized state, route decision making processes might consider route announcements intended to be marked valid as "unknown" or "invalid" for an indeterminate period.
Missing Validated Payloads negatively impact the ability to validate BGP announcements using mechanisms such as those described in and .
advises RP implementations to continue to use cached versions of objects, but only until such time as they become stale.
By detecting whether the remote Repository Server is in an inconsistent state and then immediately switching to using the latest Snapshot File, RPs increase the probability to successfully replace objects before they become stale.
IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
ReferencesNormative ReferencesKey words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement LevelsIn many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key WordsRFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.The RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), Certificate Authorities (CAs) publish certificates, including end-entity certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), and RPKI signed objects to repositories. Relying Parties retrieve the published information from those repositories. This document specifies a new RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP) for this purpose. RRDP was specifically designed for scaling. It relies on an Update Notification File which lists the current Snapshot and Delta Files that can be retrieved using HTTPS (HTTP over Transport Layer Security (TLS)), and it enables the use of Content Distribution Networks (CDNs) or other caching infrastructures for the retrieval of these files.Informative ReferencesBGP AS_PATH Verification Based on Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) ObjectsYandexQrator LabsInternet Initiative Japan & Arrcus, Inc.ArrcusFastlyUSA National Institute of Standards and TechnologyThis document describes procedures that make use of Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) objects in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to verify the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) AS_PATH attribute of advertised routes. This type of AS_PATH verification provides detection and mitigation of route leaks and some forms of AS path manipulation. It also provides protection, to some degree, against prefix hijacks with forged-origin or forged- path-segment.Work in ProgressBGP Prefix Origin ValidationTo help reduce well-known threats against BGP including prefix mis- announcing and monkey-in-the-middle attacks, one of the security requirements is the ability to validate the origination Autonomous System (AS) of BGP routes. More specifically, one needs to validate that the AS number claiming to originate an address prefix (as derived from the AS_PATH attribute of the BGP route) is in fact authorized by the prefix holder to do so. This document describes a simple validation mechanism to partially satisfy this requirement. [STANDARDS-TRACK]Origin Validation Operation Based on the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)Deployment of BGP origin validation that is based on the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) has many operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and present those that are most critical. It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin validation continues to be deployed and the dynamics are better understood.Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)This document defines a "manifest" for use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). A manifest is a signed object (file) that contains a listing of all the signed objects (files) in the repository publication point (directory) associated with an authority responsible for publishing in the repository. For each certificate, Certificate Revocation List (CRL), or other type of signed objects issued by the authority that are published at this repository publication point, the manifest contains both the name of the file containing the object and a hash of the file content. Manifests are intended to enable a relying party (RP) to detect certain forms of attacks against a repository. Specifically, if an RP checks a manifest's contents against the signed objects retrieved from a repository publication point, then the RP can detect replay attacks, and unauthorized in-flight modification or deletion of signed objects. This document obsoletes RFC 6486.AcknowledgementsDuring the hallway track at RIPE 86, shared the idea for detecting this particular form of RRDP
desynchronization, after which ,
, and produced an implementation based on rpki-client. Equipped
with tooling to detect this particular error condition, in subsequent
months it became apparent that unexpected delta mutations in the global
RPKI repositories do happen from time to time.The authors wish to thank ,
, , , , , , ,
, , and for their
careful review and feedback on this document.Authors' AddressesFastlyAmsterdamNetherlandsjob@fastly.comRIPE NCCAmsterdamNetherlandstdekock@ripe.net