<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
  <?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="rfc2629.xslt" ?>
  <!-- generated by https://github.com/cabo/kramdown-rfc version 1.6.31 (Ruby 3.2.2) -->


<!DOCTYPE rfc  [
  <!ENTITY nbsp    "&#160;">
  <!ENTITY zwsp   "&#8203;">
  <!ENTITY nbhy   "&#8209;">
  <!ENTITY wj     "&#8288;">

]>

<?rfc rfcedstyle="yes"?>
<?rfc tocindent="yes"?>
<?rfc strict="yes"?>
<?rfc comments="yes"?>
<?rfc inline="yes"?>
<?rfc text-list-symbols="-o*+"?>
<?rfc docmapping="yes"?>

<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-suit-mud-04" category="std" consensus="true" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="SUIT MUD Linkage">Strong Assertions of IoT Network Access Requirements</title>

    <author initials="B." surname="Moran" fullname="Brendan Moran">
      <organization>Arm Limited</organization>
      <address>
        <email>brendan.moran.ietf@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="H." surname="Tschofenig" fullname="Hannes Tschofenig">
      <organization></organization>
      <address>
        <email>hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2023" month="July" day="04"/>

    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>SUIT</workgroup>
    <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>

    <abstract>


<t>The Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) specification describes the access and network functionality required for a device to properly function. The MUD description has to reflect the software running on the device and its configuration. Because of this, the most appropriate entity for describing device network access requirements is the same as the entity developing the software and its configuration.</t>

<t>A network presented with a MUD file by a device allows detection of misbehavior by the device software and configuration of access control.</t>

<t>This document defines a way to link a SUIT manifest to a MUD file offering a stronger binding between the two.</t>



    </abstract>



  </front>

  <middle>


<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>

<t>Under <xref target="RFC8520"/>, devices report a URL to a MUD manager in the network. RFC 8520 envisions different approaches for conveying the information from the device to the network such as:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>DHCP,</t>
  <t>IEEE802.1AB Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP), and</t>
  <t>IEEE 802.1X whereby the URL to the MUD file would be contained in the certificate used in an EAP method.</t>
</list></t>

<t>The MUD manager then uses the URL to fetch the MUD file, which contains access and network functionality required for a device to properly function.</t>

<t>The MUD manager must trust the service from which the MUD file is fetched to return an authentic copy of the MUD file. This concern may be mitigated using the optional signature reference in the MUD file. The MUD manager must also trust the device to report a correct URL. In case of DHCP and LLDP the URL is unprotected. When the URL to the MUD file is included in a certificate then it is authenticated and integrity protected. A certificate created for use with network access authentication is typically not signed by the entity that wrote the software and configured the device, which leads to conflation of local network access rights with rights to assert all network access requirements.</t>

<t>There is a need to bind the entity that creates the software and configuration to the MUD file because only that entity can attest the network access requirements of the device. This specification defines an extension to the Software Updates for Internet of Things (SUIT) manifest format <xref target="I-D.ietf-suit-manifest"/> to include a MUD file (by reference or by value). When combining a MUD file with a manifest used for software/firmware updates (potentially augmented with attestation) then a network operator can get more confidence in the description of the access and network functionality required for a device to properly function.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="terminology"><name>Terminology</name>

<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="workflow"><name>Workflow</name>

<t>The intended workflow is as follows:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>At the time of onboarding, devices report their manifest in use to the MUD manager via attestation evidence.</t>
  <t>If the SUIT_MUD_container, see <xref target="suit-extension"/>, has been severed, the MUD manager can use the suit-reference-uri to retrieve the complete SUIT manifest.</t>
  <t>The manifest authenticity is verified by the MUD manager, which enforces that the MUD file presented is also authentic and as intended by the device software vendor.</t>
  <t>Each time a device is updated, rebooted, or otherwise substantially changed, it will execute an attestation.
  <list style="symbols">
      <t>Among other claims in the Entity Attestation Token (EAT) <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-eat"/>, the device will report its software digest(s), configuration digest(s), manifest URI, and manifest digest to the MUD manager.</t>
      <t>The MUD manager can then validate these attestation reports in order to check that the device is operating with the expected version of software and configuration.</t>
      <t>Since the manifest digest is reported, the MUD manager can look up the corresponding manifest.</t>
    </list></t>
  <t>If the MUD manager does not already have a full copy of the manifest, it can be acquired using the reference URI.</t>
  <t>Once a full copy of the manifest is provided, the MUD manager can verify the device attestation report</t>
  <t>The MUD manager acquires the MUD file from the MUD URL.</t>
  <t>The MUD manager verifies the MUD file signature using the provided Subject Key Identifier.</t>
  <t>Then, the MUD manager can apply any appropriate policy as described by the MUD file.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="advantages-over-previous-mud-url-reporting-mechanisms"><name>Advantages over previous MUD URL reporting mechanisms</name>

<t>Binding within the manifest has several advantages over other MUD URL reporting mechanisms:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>The MUD URL is tightly coupled to device software/firmware version.</t>
  <t>The device does not report the URL, so the device cannot tamper with the URL.</t>
  <t>The onus is placed on the software/firmware author to provide a MUD file that describes the behavior of the software running on a device.</t>
  <t>The author explicitly authorizes a key to sign MUD files, providing a tight coupling between the party that knows device behavior best (the author of the software/firmware) and the party that declares device behavior (MUD file signer).</t>
  <t>Network operators do not need to know, a priori, which MUD URL to use for each device; this can be harvested from the device's manifest and only replaced if necessary.</t>
  <t>A network operator can still replace a MUD URL:  <list style="symbols">
      <t>By providing a manifest that overrides the MUD URL.</t>
      <t>By replacing the MUD URL in their network infrastructure.</t>
    </list></t>
  <t>Devices can be quarantined if they do not attest a known software/firmware version.</t>
  <t>Devices cannot lie about which MUD URL to use.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="suit-extension"><name>Extensions to SUIT</name>

<t>To enable strong assertions about the network access requirements that a device should have for a particular software/configuration pair a MUD URL is added to the SUIT manifest along with a subject key identifier (ski).
The subject key identifier MUST be generated according to the process defined in <xref target="I-D.isobe-cose-key-thumbprint"/>.</t>

<t>The following CDDL describes the extension to the SUIT_Manifest structure:</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="CDDL"><![CDATA[
$$severable-manifest-members-choice-extensions //= (
  suit-manifest-mud => SUIT_Digest / SUIT_MUD_container
)
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>The SUIT_Envelope is also amended:</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="CDDL"><![CDATA[
$$SUIT_severable-members-extensions //= (
  suit-manifest-mud => bstr .cbor SUIT_MUD_container
)
]]></sourcecode></figure>

<t>The SUIT_MUD_container structure is defined as follows:</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="CDDL"><![CDATA[
SUIT_MUD_container = {
    suit-mud-url => #6.32(tstr),
    suit-mud-ski => SUIT_Digest,
}
]]></sourcecode></figure>

</section>
<section anchor="security-considerations"><name>Security Considerations</name>

<t>This specification links MUD files to other IETF technologies, particularly to SUIT manifests, for improving security protection and ease of use. By including MUD files (by reference or by value) in SUIT manifests an extra layer of protection has been created and synchronization risks can be minimized. If the MUD file and the software/firmware loaded onto the device gets out-of-sync a device may be firewalled and, with firewalling by networks in place, the device may stop functioning.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="iana-considerations"><name>IANA Considerations</name>

<t>IANA is requested to add a new value to the SUIT manifest elements registry created with <xref target="I-D.ietf-suit-manifest"/>:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Label: TBD1 [[Value allocated from the standards action address range]]</t>
  <t>Name: Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD)</t>
  <t>Reference: [[TBD: This document]]</t>
</list></t>

<t>IANA is requested to add a new value to the SUIT envelope elements registry created with <xref target="I-D.ietf-suit-manifest"/>:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>Label: TBD2 [[Value allocated from the standards action address range]]</t>
  <t>Name: Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD)</t>
  <t>Reference: [[TBD: This document]]</t>
</list></t>

</section>


  </middle>

  <back>


    <references title='Normative References'>



<reference anchor='RFC7093'>
  <front>
    <title>Additional Methods for Generating Key Identifiers Values</title>
    <author fullname='S. Turner' initials='S.' surname='Turner'/>
    <author fullname='S. Kent' initials='S.' surname='Kent'/>
    <author fullname='J. Manger' initials='J.' surname='Manger'/>
    <date month='December' year='2013'/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document specifies additional example methods for generating Key Identifier values for use in the AKI (Authority Key Identifier) and SKI (Subject Key Identifier) certificate extensions.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name='RFC' value='7093'/>
  <seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC7093'/>
</reference>

<reference anchor='RFC8520'>
  <front>
    <title>Manufacturer Usage Description Specification</title>
    <author fullname='E. Lear' initials='E.' surname='Lear'/>
    <author fullname='R. Droms' initials='R.' surname='Droms'/>
    <author fullname='D. Romascanu' initials='D.' surname='Romascanu'/>
    <date month='March' year='2019'/>
    <abstract>
      <t>This memo specifies a component-based architecture for Manufacturer Usage Descriptions (MUDs). The goal of MUD is to provide a means for end devices to signal to the network what sort of access and network functionality they require to properly function. The initial focus is on access control. Later work can delve into other aspects.</t>
      <t>This memo specifies two YANG modules, IPv4 and IPv6 DHCP options, a Link Layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) TLV, a URL, an X.509 certificate extension, and a means to sign and verify the descriptions.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name='RFC' value='8520'/>
  <seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC8520'/>
</reference>

<reference anchor='RFC2119'>
  <front>
    <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
    <author fullname='S. Bradner' initials='S.' surname='Bradner'/>
    <date month='March' year='1997'/>
    <abstract>
      <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name='BCP' value='14'/>
  <seriesInfo name='RFC' value='2119'/>
  <seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC2119'/>
</reference>

<reference anchor='RFC8174'>
  <front>
    <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
    <author fullname='B. Leiba' initials='B.' surname='Leiba'/>
    <date month='May' year='2017'/>
    <abstract>
      <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name='BCP' value='14'/>
  <seriesInfo name='RFC' value='8174'/>
  <seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC8174'/>
</reference>


<reference anchor='I-D.ietf-rats-eat'>
   <front>
      <title>The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)</title>
      <author fullname='Laurence Lundblade' initials='L.' surname='Lundblade'>
         <organization>Security Theory LLC</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Giridhar Mandyam' initials='G.' surname='Mandyam'>
         <organization>Qualcomm Technologies Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Jeremy O&#x27;Donoghue' initials='J.' surname='O&#x27;Donoghue'>
         <organization>Qualcomm Technologies Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Carl Wallace' initials='C.' surname='Wallace'>
         <organization>Red Hound Software, Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <date day='30' month='June' year='2023'/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   An Entity Attestation Token (EAT) provides an attested claims set
   that describes state and characteristics of an entity, a device like
   a smartphone, IoT device, network equipment or such.  This claims set
   is used by a relying party, server or service to determine how much
   it wishes to trust the entity.

   An EAT is either a CBOR Web Token (CWT) or JSON Web Token (JWT) with
   attestation-oriented claims.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-ietf-rats-eat-21'/>
   
</reference>


<reference anchor='I-D.ietf-suit-manifest'>
   <front>
      <title>A Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)-based Serialization Format for the Software Updates for Internet of Things (SUIT) Manifest</title>
      <author fullname='Brendan Moran' initials='B.' surname='Moran'>
         <organization>Arm Limited</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Hannes Tschofenig' initials='H.' surname='Tschofenig'>
         <organization>Arm Limited</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Henk Birkholz' initials='H.' surname='Birkholz'>
         <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Koen Zandberg' initials='K.' surname='Zandberg'>
         <organization>Inria</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Øyvind Rønningstad' initials='O.' surname='Rønningstad'>
         <organization>Nordic Semiconductor</organization>
      </author>
      <date day='27' month='February' year='2023'/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This specification describes the format of a manifest.  A manifest is
   a bundle of metadata about code/data obtained by a recipient (chiefly
   the firmware for an IoT device), where to find the that code/data,
   the devices to which it applies, and cryptographic information
   protecting the manifest.  Software updates and Trusted Invocation
   both tend to use sequences of common operations, so the manifest
   encodes those sequences of operations, rather than declaring the
   metadata.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-ietf-suit-manifest-22'/>
   
</reference>


<reference anchor='I-D.isobe-cose-key-thumbprint'>
   <front>
      <title>COSE Key Thumbprint</title>
      <author fullname='Kohei Isobe' initials='K.' surname='Isobe'>
         <organization>SECOM CO., LTD.</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Hannes Tschofenig' initials='H.' surname='Tschofenig'>
         </author>
      <date day='16' month='June' year='2023'/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This specification defines a method for computing a hash value over a
   COSE Key. It defines which fields in a COSE Key structure are used in
   the hash computation, the method of creating a canonical form of the
   fields, and how to hash the byte sequence.  The resulting hash value
   can be used for identifying or selecting a key that is the subject of
   the thumbprint.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-isobe-cose-key-thumbprint-02'/>
   
</reference>




    </references>




  </back>

<!-- ##markdown-source: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-->

</rfc>

