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Applications and Real-Time Internet-Draft This document describes the Secure Frame (SFrame) end-to-end encryption and authentication mechanism for media frames in a multiparty conference call, in which central media servers (selective forwarding units or SFUs) can access the media metadata needed to make forwarding decisions without having access to the actual media. The proposed mechanism differs from the Secure Real-Time Protocol (SRTP) in that it is independent of RTP (thus compatible with non-RTP media transport) and can be applied to whole media frames in order to be more bandwidth efficient. About This Document The latest revision of this draft can be found at . Status information for this document may be found at . Discussion of this document takes place on the Secure Media Frames Working Group mailing list (), which is archived at . Subscribe at . Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at .

Introduction Modern multi-party video call systems use Selective Forwarding Unit (SFU) servers to efficiently route media streams to call endpoints based on factors such as available bandwidth, desired video size, codec support, and other factors. An SFU typically does not need access to the media content of the conference, allowing for the media to be "end-to-end" encrypted so that it cannot be decrypted by the SFU. In order for the SFU to work properly, though, it usually needs to be able to access RTP metadata and RTCP feedback messages, which is not possible if all RTP/RTCP traffic is end-to-end encrypted. As such, two layers of encryptions and authentication are required:

1. Hop-by-hop (HBH) encryption of media, metadata, and feedback messages between the the endpoints and SFU
2. End-to-end (E2E) encryption of media between the endpoints

The Secure Real-Time Protocol (SRTP) is already widely used for HBH encryption . The SRTP "double encryption" scheme defines a way to do E2E encryption in SRTP . Unfortunately, this scheme has poor efficiency and high complexity, and its entanglement with RTP makes it unworkable in several realistic SFU scenarios. This document proposes a new end-to-end encryption mechanism known as SFrame, specifically designed to work in group conference calls with SFUs. SFrame is a general encryption framing that can be used to protect media payloads, agnostic of transport.

Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

IV:

Initialization Vector

MAC:

Message Authentication Code

E2EE:

End to End Encryption

HBH:

Hop By Hop

We use "Selective Forwarding Unit (SFU)" and "media stream" in a less formal sense than in . An SFU is a selective switching function for media payloads, and a media stream a sequence of media payloads, in both cases regardless of whether those media payloads are transported over RTP or some other protocol.

Goals SFrame is designed to be a suitable E2EE protection scheme for conference call media in a broad range of scenarios, as outlined by the following goals:

1. Provide an secure E2EE mechanism for audio and video in conference calls that can be used with arbitrary SFU servers.
2. Decouple media encryption from key management to allow SFrame to be used with an arbitrary key management system.
3. Minimize packet expansion to allow successful conferencing in as many network conditions as possible.
4. Independence from the underlying transport, including use in non-RTP transports, e.g., WebTransport .
5. When used with RTP and its associated error resilience mechanisms, i.e., RTX and FEC, require no special handling for RTX and FEC packets.
6. Minimize the changes needed in SFU servers.
7. Minimize the changes needed in endpoints.
8. Work with the most popular audio and video codecs used in conferencing scenarios.

SFrame This document defines an encryption mechanism that provides effective end-to-end encryption, is simple to implement, has no dependencies on RTP, and minimizes encryption bandwidth overhead. Because SFrame can encrypt a full frame, rather than individual packets, bandwidth overhead can be reduced by adding encryption overhead only once per media frame, instead of once per packet.

Application Context SFrame is a general encryption framing, intended to be used as an E2E encryption layer over an underlying HBH-encrypted transport such as SRTP or QUIC . The scale at which SFrame encryption is applied to media determines the overall amount of overhead that SFrame adds to the media stream, as well as the engineering complexity involved in integrating SFrame into a particular environment. Two patterns are common: Either using SFrame to encrypt whole media frames (per-frame) or individual transport-level media payloads (per-packet). For example, shows a typical media sender stack that takes media in from some source, encodes it into frames, divides those frames into media packets, and then sends those payloads in SRTP packets. The receiver stack performs the reverse operations, reassembling frames from SRTP packets and decoding. Arrows indicate two different ways that SFrame protection could be integrated into this media stack, to encrypt whole frames or individual media packets. Applying SFrame per-frame in this system offers higher efficiency, but may require a more complex integration in environments where depacketization relies on the content of media packets. Applying SFrame per-packet avoids this complexity, at the cost of higher bandwidth consumption. Some quantitative discussion of these trade-offs is provided in . As noted above, however, SFrame is a general media encapsulation, and can be applied in other scenarios. The important thing is that the sender and receivers of an SFrame-encrypted object agree on that object's semantics. SFrame does not provide this agreement; it must be arranged by the application.

| Packetize |----->| Protect |-----------+ '+' | | | ^ | | ^ | | | | /|\ | +----------+ | +-------------+ | +-----------+ | | / + \ | | | ^ | | / \ | SFrame SFrame | | | / \ | Protect Protect | | | Alice | (per-frame) (per-packet) | | | | ^ ^ | | | | | | | | | +-----------------|-------------------|---------|--------+ | | | | v | | | +---+----+ | E2E Key | | HBH Key | Media | +---- Management ---+ | Management | Server | | | | +---+----+ | | | | +-----------------|-------------------|---------|--------+ | | | | | | | | V V | | | .-. | SFrame SFrame | | | | | | Unprotect Unprotect | | | '+' | (per-frame) (per-packet) | | | /|\ | | | V | | / + \ | +----------+ | +-------------+ | +-----------+ | | / \ | | | V | | V | HBH | | | / \ | | Decode |<-----| Depacketize |<-----| Unprotect |<----------+ Bob | | | | | | | | | +----------+ +-------------+ +-----------+ | | | +--------------------------------------------------------+ ]]>

Like SRTP, SFrame does not define how the keys used for SFrame are exchanged by the parties in the conference. Keys for SFrame might be distributed over an existing E2E-secure channel (see ), or derived from an E2E-secure shared secret (see ). The key management system MUST ensure that each key used for encrypting media is used by exactly one media sender, in order to avoid reuse of IVs.

SFrame Ciphertext An SFrame ciphertext comprises an SFrame header followed by the output of an AEAD encryption of the plaintext , with the header provided as additional authenticated data (AAD). The SFrame header is a variable-length structure described in detail in . The structure of the encrypted data and authentication tag are determined by the AEAD algorithm in use. +-+----+-+----+--------------------+--------------------+ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Encrypted Data | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +->+-------------------------------------------------------+<-+ | | Authentication Tag | | | +-------------------------------------------------------+ | | | | | +--- Encrypted Portion Authenticated Portion ---+ ]]> When SFrame is applied per-packet, the payload of each packet will be an SFrame ciphertext. When SFrame is applied per-frame, the SFrame ciphertext representing an encrypted frame will span several packets, with the header appearing in the first packet and the authentication tag in the last packet.

SFrame Header The SFrame header specifies two values from which encryption parameters are derived:

• A Key ID (KID) that determines which encryption key should be used
• A counter (CTR) that is used to construct the IV for the encryption

Applications MUST ensure that each (KID, CTR) combination is used for exactly one encryption operation. A typical approach to achieving this gaurantee is outlined in .

SFrame header

The SFrame Header has the overall structure shown in . The first byte is a "config byte", with the following fields:

Extended Key Id Flag (X, 1 bit):

Indicates if the K field contains the key id or the key id length.

Key or Key Length (K, 3 bits):

This field contains the key id (KID) if the X flag is set to 0, or the key id length if set to 1.

Extended Counter Flag (Y, 1 bit):

Indicates if the C field contains the counter or the counter length.

Counter or Counter Length (C, 3 bits):

This field contains the counter (CTR) if the Y flag is set to 0, or the counter length if set to 1.

The Key ID and Counter fields are encoded as compact unsigned integers in network (big-endian) byte order. If the value of one of these fields is in the range 0-7, then the value is carried in the corresponding bits of the config byte (K or C) and the corresponding flag (X or Y) is set to zero. Otherwise, the value MUST be encoded with the minimum number of bytes required and appended after the configuration byte, with the Key ID first and Counter second. The header field (K or C) is set to the number of bytes in the encoded value, minus one. The value 000 represents a length of 1, 001 a length of 2, etc. This allows a 3-bit length field to represent the value lengths 1-8. The SFrame header can thus take one of the four forms shown in , depending on which of the X and Y flags are set.

Forms of Encoded SFrame Header = 8: +-+-----+-+-----+------------------------+ |0| KID |1|CLEN | CTR... (length=CLEN) | +-+-----+-+-----+------------------------+ KID >= 8, CTR < 8: +-+-----+-+-----+------------------------+ |1|KLEN |0| CTR | KID... (length=KLEN) | +-+-----+-+-----+------------------------+ KID >= 8, CTR >= 8: +-+-----+-+-----+------------------------+------------------------+ |1|KLEN |1|CLEN | KID... (length=KLEN) | CTR... (length=CLEN) | +-+-----+-+-----+------------------------+------------------------+ ]]>

Encryption Schema SFrame encryption uses an AEAD encryption algorithm and hash function defined by the cipher suite in use (see ). We will refer to the following aspects of the AEAD algorithm below:

• AEAD.Encrypt and AEAD.Decrypt - The encryption and decryption functions for the AEAD. We follow the convention of RFC 5116 and consider the authentication tag part of the ciphertext produced by AEAD.Encrypt (as opposed to a separate field as in SRTP ).
• AEAD.Nk - The size in bytes of a key for the encryption algorithm
• AEAD.Nn - The size in bytes of a nonce for the encryption algorithm
• AEAD.Nt - The overhead in bytes of the encryption algorithm (typically the size of a "tag" that is added to the plaintext)

Key Selection Each SFrame encryption or decryption operation is premised on a single secret base_key, which is labeled with an integer KID value signaled in the SFrame header. The sender and receivers need to agree on which key should be used for a given KID. The process for provisioning keys and their KID values is beyond the scope of this specification, but its security properties will bound the assurances that SFrame provides. For example, if SFrame is used to provide E2E security against intermediary media nodes, then SFrame keys need to be negotiated in a way that does not make them accessible to these intermediaries. For each known KID value, the client stores the corresponding symmetric key base_key. For keys that can be used for encryption, the client also stores the next counter value CTR to be used when encrypting (initially 0). When encrypting a plaintext, the application specifies which KID is to be used, and the counter is incremented after successful encryption. When decrypting, the base_key for decryption is selected from the available keys using the KID value in the SFrame Header. A given key MUST NOT be used for encryption by multiple senders. Such reuse would result in multiple encrypted frames being generated with the same (key, nonce) pair, which harms the protections provided by many AEAD algorithms. Implementations SHOULD mark each key as usable for encryption or decryption, never both. Note that the set of available keys might change over the lifetime of a real-time session. In such cases, the client will need to manage key usage to avoid media loss due to a key being used to encrypt before all receivers are able to use it to decrypt. For example, an application may make decryption-only keys available immediately, but delay the use of keys for encryption until (a) all receivers have acknowledged receipt of the new key or (b) a timeout expires.

Key Derivation SFrame encrytion and decryption use a key and salt derived from the base_key associated to a KID. Given a base_key value, the key and salt are derived using HKDF as follows: In the derivation of sframe_secret: * The + operator represents concatenation of byte strings. * The KID value is encoded as an 8-byte big-endian integer, not the compressed form used in the SFrame header. * The cipher_suite value is a 2-byte big-endian integer representing the cipher suite in use (see ). The hash function used for HKDF is determined by the cipher suite in use.

Encryption SFrame encryption uses the AEAD encryption algorithm for the cipher suite in use. The key for the encryption is the sframe_key and the nonce is formed by XORing the sframe_salt with the current counter, encoded as a big-endian integer of length AEAD.Nn. The encryptor forms an SFrame header using the CTR, and KID values provided. The encoded header is provided as AAD to the AEAD encryption operation, together with application-provided metadata about the encrypted media (see ). For example, the metadata input to encryption allows for frame metadata to be authenticated when SFrame is applied per-frame. After encoding the frame and before packetizing it, the necessary media metadata will be moved out of the encoded frame buffer, to be sent in some channel visible to the SFU (e.g., an RTP header extension).

Encryption flow | AAD +-----+ | | S | | +-----+ | | KID +--+--> sframe_key ----->| Key | | | | | | +--> sframe_salt --+ | +-----+ | | | CTR +---------------------+->| Nonce | | | | | | +-----+ | | AEAD.Encrypt | | | +---------------+ | +---->| SFrame Header | | +---------------+ | | | | | |<----+ | ciphertext | | | | | +---------------+ ]]>

Decryption Before decrypting, a client needs to assemble a full SFrame ciphertext. When an SFrame ciphertext may be fragmented into multiple parts for transport (e.g., a whole encrypted frame sent in multiple SRTP packets), the receiving client collects all the fragments of the ciphertext, using an appropriate sequencing and start/end markers in the transport. Once all of the required fragments are available, the client reassembles them into the SFrame ciphertext, then passes the ciphertext to SFrame for decryption. The KID field in the SFrame header is used to find the right key and salt for the encrypted frame, and the CTR field is used to construct the nonce. If a ciphertext fails to decrypt because there is no key available for the KID in the SFrame header, the client MAY buffer the ciphertext and retry decryption once a key with that KID is received.

Cipher Suites Each SFrame session uses a single cipher suite that specifies the following primitives:

• A hash function used for key derivation
• An AEAD encryption algorithm used for frame encryption, optionally with a truncated authentication tag

This document defines the following cipher suites, with the constants defined in : SFrame cipher suite constants

Name	Nh	Nk	Nn	Nt
AES_128_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_80	32	48	12	10
AES_128_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_64	32	48	12	8
AES_128_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_32	32	48	12	4
AES_128_GCM_SHA256_128	32	16	12	16
AES_256_GCM_SHA512_128	64	32	12	16

Numeric identifiers for these cipher suites are defined in the IANA registry created in . In the suite names, the length of the authentication tag is indicated by the last value: "_128" indicates a hundred-twenty-eight-bit tag, "_80" indicates a eighty-bit tag, "_64" indicates a sixty-four-bit tag and "_32" indicates a thirty-two-bit tag. In a session that uses multiple media streams, different cipher suites might be configured for different media streams. For example, in order to conserve bandwidth, a session might use a cipher suite with eighty-bit tags for video frames and another cipher suite with thirty-two-bit tags for audio frames.

AES-CTR with SHA2 In order to allow very short tag sizes, we define a synthetic AEAD function using the authenticated counter mode of AES together with HMAC for authentication. We use an encrypt-then-MAC approach, as in SRTP . Before encryption or decryption, encryption and authentication subkeys are derived from the single AEAD key. The overall length of the AEAD key is Nka + Nh, where Nka represents the key size for the AES block cipher in use and Nh represents the output size of the hash function (as in ). The encryption subkey comprises the first Nka bytes and the authentication subkey comprises the remaining Nh bytes. The AEAD encryption and decryption functions are then composed of individual calls to the CTR encrypt function and HMAC. The resulting MAC value is truncated to a number of bytes Nt fixed by the cipher suite.

Key Management SFrame must be integrated with an E2E key management framework to exchange and rotate the keys used for SFrame encryption. The key management framework provides the following functions:

• Provisioning KID / base_key mappings to participating clients
• Updating the above data as clients join or leave

It is the responsibility of the application to provide the key management framework, as described in .

Sender Keys If the participants in a call have a pre-existing E2E-secure channel, they can use it to distribute SFrame keys. Each client participating in a call generates a fresh base_key value that it will use to encrypt media. The client then uses the E2E-secure channel to send their encryption key to the other participants. In this scheme, it is assumed that receivers have a signal outside of SFrame for which client has sent a given frame (e.g., an RTP SSRC). SFrame KID values are then used to distinguish between versions of the sender's base_key. Key IDs in this scheme have two parts, a "key generation" and a "ratchet step". Both are unsigned integers that begin at zero. The key generation increments each time the sender distributes a new key to receivers. The "ratchet step" is incremented each time the sender ratchets their key forward for forward secrecy: For compactness, we do not send the whole ratchet step. Instead, we send only its low-order R bits, where R is a value set by the application. Different senders may use different values of R, but each receiver of a given sender needs to know what value of R is used by the sender so that they can recognize when they need to ratchet (vs. expecting a new key). R effectively defines a re-ordering window, since no more than 2^R ratchet steps can be active at a given time. The key generation is sent in the remaining 64 - R bits of the key ID.

Structure of a KID in the Sender Keys scheme <------------> +-----------------+--------------+ | Key Generation | Ratchet Step | +-----------------+--------------+ ]]>

The sender signals such a ratchet step update by sending with a KID value in which the ratchet step has been incremented. A receiver who receives from a sender with a new KID computes the new key as above. The old key may be kept for some time to allow for out-of-order delivery, but should be deleted promptly. If a new participant joins mid-call, they will need to receive from each sender (a) the current sender key for that sender and (b) the current KID value for the sender. Evicting a participant requires each sender to send a fresh sender key to all receivers.

MLS The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol provides group authenticated key exchange . In principle, it could be used to instantiate the sender key scheme above, but it can also be used more efficiently directly. MLS creates a linear sequence of keys, each of which is shared among the members of a group at a given point in time. When a member joins or leaves the group, a new key is produced that is known only to the augmented or reduced group. Each step in the lifetime of the group is know as an "epoch", and each member of the group is assigned an "index" that is constant for the time they are in the group. To generate keys and nonces for SFrame, we use the MLS exporter function to generate a base_key value for each MLS epoch. Each member of the group is assigned a set of KID values, so that each member has a unique sframe_key and sframe_salt that it uses to encrypt with. Senders may choose any KID value within their assigned set of KID values, e.g., to allow a single sender to send multiple uncoordinated outbound media streams. For compactness, we do not send the whole epoch number. Instead, we send only its low-order E bits, where E is a value set by the application. E effectively defines a re-ordering window, since no more than 2^E epochs can be active at a given time. Receivers MUST be prepared for the epoch counter to roll over, removing an old epoch when a new epoch with the same E lower bits is introduced. Let S be the number of bits required to encode a member index in the group, i.e., the smallest value such that group_size < (1 << S). The sender index is encoded in the S bits above the epoch. The remaining 64 - S - E bits of the KID value are a context value chosen by the sender (context value 0` will produce the shortest encoded KID).

Structure of a KID for an MLS Sender <------> <------> +-------------+--------+-------+ | Context ID | Index | Epoch | +-------------+--------+-------+ ]]>

Once an SFrame stack has been provisioned with the sframe_epoch_secret for an epoch, it can compute the required KID values on demand (as well as the resulting SFrame keys/nonces derived from the base_key and KID), as it needs to encrypt or decrypt for a given member.

An example sequence of KIDs for an MLS-based SFrame session. We assume that the group has 64 members, S=6. KID = 0x3e | | | +-- index=7 ---> KID = 0x7e | | | +-- index=20 --> KID = 0x14e | | Epoch 15 +--+-- index=3 ---> KID = 0x3f | | | +-- index=5 ---> KID = 0x5f | | Epoch 16 +----- index=2 --+--> context = 2 --> KID = 0x820 | | | +--> context = 3 --> KID = 0xc20 | | Epoch 17 +--+-- index=33 --> KID = 0x211 | | | +-- index=51 --> KID = 0x331 | | ... ]]>

Media Considerations

Selective Forwarding Units Selective Forwarding Units (SFUs) (e.g., those described in ) receive the media streams from each participant and select which ones should be forwarded to each of the other participants. There are several approaches about how to do this stream selection but in general, in order to do so, the SFU needs to access metadata associated to each frame and modify the RTP information of the incoming packets when they are transmitted to the received participants. This section describes how this normal SFU modes of operation interacts with the E2EE provided by SFrame

LastN and RTP stream reuse The SFU may choose to send only a certain number of streams based on the voice activity of the participants. To avoid the overhead involved in establishing new transport streams, the SFU may decide to reuse previously existing streams or even pre-allocate a predefined number of streams and choose in each moment in time which participant media will be sent through it. This means that in the same transport-level stream (e.g., an RTP stream defined by either SSRC or MID) may carry media from different streams of different participants. As different keys are used by each participant for encoding their media, the receiver will be able to verify which is the sender of the media coming within the RTP stream at any given point in time, preventing the SFU trying to impersonate any of the participants with another participant's media. Note that in order to prevent impersonation by a malicious participant (not the SFU), a mechanism based on digital signature would be required. SFrame does not protect against such attacks.

Simulcast When using simulcast, the same input image will produce N different encoded frames (one per simulcast layer) which would be processed independently by the frame encryptor and assigned an unique counter for each.

SVC In both temporal and spatial scalability, the SFU may choose to drop layers in order to match a certain bitrate or forward specific media sizes or frames per second. In order to support it, the sender MUST encode each spatial layer of a given picture in a different frame. That is, an RTP frame may contain more than one SFrame encrypted frame with an incrementing frame counter.

Video Key Frames Forward and Post-Compromise Security requires that the e2ee keys are updated anytime a participant joins/leave the call. The key exchange happens asynchronously and on a different path than the SFU signaling and media. So it may happen that when a new participant joins the call and the SFU side requests a key frame, the sender generates the e2ee encrypted frame with a key not known by the receiver, so it will be discarded. When the sender updates his sending key with the new key, it will send it in a non-key frame, so the receiver will be able to decrypt it, but not decode it. Receiver will re-request an key frame then, but due to sender and SFU policies, that new key frame could take some time to be generated. If the sender sends a key frame when the new e2ee key is in use, the time required for the new participant to display the video is minimized.

Partial Decoding Some codes support partial decoding, where it can decrypt individual packets without waiting for the full frame to arrive, with SFrame this won't be possible because the decoder will not access the packets until the entire frame has arrived and was decrypted.

Security Considerations

No Header Confidentiality SFrame provides integrity protection to the SFrame Header (the key ID and counter values), but does not provide confidentiality protection. Parties that can observe the SFrame header may learn, for example, which parties are sending SFrame payloads (from KID values) and at what rates (from CTR values). In cases where SFrame is used for end-to-end security on top of hop-by-hop protections (e.g., running over SRTP as described in ), the hop-by-hop security mechanisms provide confidentiality protection of the SFrame header between hops.

No Per-Sender Authentication SFrame does not provide per-sender authentication of media data. Any sender in a session can send media that will be associated with any other sender. This is because SFrame uses symmetric encryption to protect media data, so that any receiver also has the keys required to encrypt packets for the sender.

Key Management Key exchange mechanism is out of scope of this document, however every client SHOULD change their keys when new clients joins or leaves the call for "Forward Secrecy" and "Post Compromise Security".

Authentication tag length The cipher suites defined in this draft use short authentication tags for encryption, however it can easily support other ciphers with full authentication tag if the short ones are proved insecure.

Replay The handling of replay is out of the scope of this document. However, senders MUST reject requests to encrypt multiple times with the same key and nonce, since several AEAD algorithms fail badly in such cases (see, e.g., ).

IANA Considerations This document requests the creation of the following new IANA registries:

• SFrame Cipher Suites ()

This registries should be under a heading of "SFrame", and assignments are made via the Specification Required policy . RFC EDITOR: Please replace XXXX throughout with the RFC number assigned to this document

SFrame Cipher Suites This registry lists identifiers for SFrame cipher suites, as defined in . The cipher suite field is two bytes wide, so the valid cipher suites are in the range 0x0000 to 0xFFFF. Template:

• Value: The numeric value of the cipher suite
• Name: The name of the cipher suite
• Reference: The document where this wire format is defined

Initial contents: SFrame cipher suites

Value	Name	Reference
0x0001	AES_128_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_80	RFC XXXX
0x0002	AES_128_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_64	RFC XXXX
0x0003	AES_128_CTR_HMAC_SHA256_32	RFC XXXX
0x0004	AES_128_GCM_SHA256_128	RFC XXXX
0x0005	AES_256_GCM_SHA512_128	RFC XXXX
0xF000 - 0xFFFF	Reserved for private use	RFC XXXX

Application Responsibilities To use SFrame, an application needs to define the inputs to the SFrame encryption and decryption operations, and how SFrame ciphertexts are delivered from sender to receiver (including any fragmentation and reassembly). In this section, we lay out additional requirements that an integration must meet in order for SFrame to operate securely.

Header Value Uniqueness Applications MUST ensure that each (KID, CTR) combination is used for exactly one encryption operation. Typically this is done by assigning each sender a KID or set of KIDs, then having each sender use the CTR field as a monotonic counter, incrementing for each plaintext that is encrypted. Note that in addition to its simplicity, this scheme minimizes overhead by keeping CTR values as small as possible.

Key Management Framework It is up to the application to provision SFrame with a mapping of KID values to base_key values and the resulting keys and salts. More importantly, the application specifies which KID values are used for which purposes (e.g., by which senders). An applications KID assignment strategy MUST be structured to assure the non-reuse properties discussed above. It is also up to the application to define a rotation schedule for keys. For example, one application might have an ephemeral group for every call and keep rotating keys when end points join or leave the call, while another application could have a persistent group that can be used for multiple calls and simply derives ephemeral symmetric keys for a specific call. It should be noted that KID values are not encrypted by SFrame, and are thus visible to any application-layer intermediaries that might handle an SFrame ciphertext. If there are application semantics included in KID values, then this information would be exposed to intermediaries. For example, in the scheme of , the number of ratchet steps per sender is exposed, and in the scheme of , the number of epochs and the MLS sender ID of the SFrame sender are exposed.

Anti-Replay It is the responsibility of the application to handle anti-replay. Replay by network attackers is assumed to be prevented by network-layer facilities (e.g., TLS, SRTP). As mentioned in , senders MUST reject requests to encrypt multiple times with the same key and nonce. It is not mandatory to implement anti-replay on the receiver side. Receivers MAY apply time or counter based anti-replay mitigations.

Metadata The metadata input to SFrame operations is pure application-specified data. As such, it is up to the application to define what information should go in the metadata input and ensure that it is provided to the encryption and decryption functions at the appropriate points. A receiver SHOULD NOT use SFrame-authenticated metadata until after the SFrame decrypt function has authenticated it. Note: The metadata input is a feature at risk, and needs more confirmation that it is useful and/or needed.

References Normative References In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. This document defines algorithms for Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD), and defines a uniform interface and a registry for such algorithms. The interface and registry can be used as an application-independent set of cryptoalgorithm suites. This approach provides advantages in efficiency and security, and promotes the reuse of crypto implementations. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document specifies a simple Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF), which can be used as a building block in various protocols and applications. The key derivation function (KDF) is intended to support a wide range of applications and requirements, and is conservative in its use of cryptographic hash functions. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. Many protocols make use of points of extensibility that use constants to identify various protocol parameters. To ensure that the values in these fields do not have conflicting uses and to promote interoperability, their allocations are often coordinated by a central record keeper. For IETF protocols, that role is filled by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). To make assignments in a given registry prudently, guidance describing the conditions under which new values should be assigned, as well as when and how modifications to existing values can be made, is needed. This document defines a framework for the documentation of these guidelines by specification authors, in order to assure that the provided guidance for the IANA Considerations is clear and addresses the various issues that are likely in the operation of a registry. This is the third edition of this document; it obsoletes RFC 5226. Informative References This document describes the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP), a profile of the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP), which can provide confidentiality, message authentication, and replay protection to the RTP traffic and to the control traffic for RTP, the Real-time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP). [STANDARDS-TRACK] In some conferencing scenarios, it is desirable for an intermediary to be able to manipulate some parameters in Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) packets, while still providing strong end-to-end security guarantees. This document defines a cryptographic transform for the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) that uses two separate but related cryptographic operations to provide hop-by-hop and end-to-end security guarantees. Both the end-to-end and hop-by-hop cryptographic algorithms can utilize an authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) algorithm or take advantage of future SRTP transforms with different properties. The terminology about, and associations among, Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) sources can be complex and somewhat opaque. This document describes a number of existing and proposed properties and relationships among RTP sources and defines common terminology for discussing protocol entities and their relationships. Google The WebTransport Protocol Framework enables clients constrained by the Web security model to communicate with a remote server using a secure multiplexed transport. It consists of a set of individual protocols that are safe to expose to untrusted applications, combined with an abstract model that allows them to be used interchangeably. This document defines the overall requirements on the protocols used in WebTransport, as well as the common features of the protocols, support for some of which may be optional. Twitch Meta Cisco Google This document defines the core behavior for Media over QUIC Transport (MOQT), a media transport protocol over QUIC. MOQT allows a producer of media to publish data and have it consumed via subscription by a multiplicity of endpoints. It supports intermediate content distribution networks and is designed for high scale and low latency distribution. Inria & Mozilla Mozilla Google Wire The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol (I-D.ietf-mls-protocol) provides a Group Key Agreement protocol for messaging applications. MLS is meant to protect against eavesdropping, tampering, message forgery, and provide Forward Secrecy (FS) and Post-Compromise Security (PCS). This document describes the architecture for using MLS in a general secure group messaging infrastructure and defines the security goals for MLS. It provides guidance on building a group messaging system and discusses security and privacy tradeoffs offered by multiple security mechanisms that are part of the MLS protocol (e.g., frequency of public encryption key rotation). The document also provides guidance for parts of the infrastructure that are not standardized by MLS and are instead left to the application. While the recommendations of this document are not mandatory to follow in order to interoperate at the protocol level, they affect the overall security guarantees that are achieved by a messaging application. This is especially true in the case of active adversaries that are able to compromise clients, the delivery service, or the authentication service. Cisco Inria & Mozilla Phoenix R&D Meta Platforms Google University of Oxford Messaging applications are increasingly making use of end-to-end security mechanisms to ensure that messages are only accessible to the communicating endpoints, and not to any servers involved in delivering messages. Establishing keys to provide such protections is challenging for group chat settings, in which more than two clients need to agree on a key but may not be online at the same time. In this document, we specify a key establishment protocol that provides efficient asynchronous group key establishment with forward secrecy (FS) and post-compromise security (PCS) for groups in size ranging from two to thousands. This document discusses point-to-point and multi-endpoint topologies used in environments based on the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP). In particular, centralized topologies commonly employed in the video conferencing industry are mapped to the RTP terminology. This document defines the Opus interactive speech and audio codec. Opus is designed to handle a wide range of interactive audio applications, including Voice over IP, videoconferencing, in-game chat, and even live, distributed music performances. It scales from low bitrate narrowband speech at 6 kbit/s to very high quality stereo music at 510 kbit/s. Opus uses both Linear Prediction (LP) and the Modified Discrete Cosine Transform (MDCT) to achieve good compression of both speech and music. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This memo defines the Session Description Protocol (SDP). SDP is intended for describing multimedia sessions for the purposes of session announcement, session invitation, and other forms of multimedia session initiation. [STANDARDS-TRACK] CoSMo Software CoSMo Software RTP Media Chains usually rely on piping encoder output directly to packetizers. Media packetization formats often support a specific codec format and optimize RTP packets generation accordingly. With the development of Selective Forward Unit (SFU) solutions, that do not process media content server side, the need for media content processing at the origin and at the destination has arised. RTP Media Chains used e.g. in WebRTC solutions are increasingly relying on application-specific transforms that sit in-between encoder and packetizer on one end and in-between depacketizer and decoder on the other end. This use case has become so important, that the W3C is standardizing the capacity to access encoded content with the [WebRTCInsertableStreams] API proposal. An extremely popular use case is application level end-to-end encryption of media content, using for instance [SFrame]. Whatever the modification applied to the media content, RTP packetizers can no longer expect to use packetization formats that mandate media content to be in a specific codec format. In the extreme cases like encryption, where the RTP Payload is made completely opaque to the SFUs, some extra mechanism must also be added for them to be able to route the packets without depending on RTP payload or payload headers. The traditionnal process of creating a new RTP Payload specification per content would not be practical as we would need to make a new one for each codec-transform pair. This document describes a solution, which provides the following features in the case the encoded content has been modified before reaching the packetizer: - a paylaod agnostic RTP packetization format that can be used on any media content, - a signalling mechanism for the above format and the inner payload, Both of the above mechanism are backward compatible with most of (S)RTP/RTCP mechanisms used for bandwidth estimation and congestion control in

Acknowledgements The authors wish to specially thank Dr. Alex Gouaillard as one of the early contributors to the document. His passion and energy were key to the design and development of SFrame.

Example API This section is not normative. This section describes a notional API that an SFrame implementation might expose. The core concept is an "SFrame context", within which KID values are meaningful. In the key management scheme described in , each sender has a different context; in the scheme described in , all senders share the same context. An SFrame context stores mappings from KID values to "key contexts", which are different depending on whether the KID is to be used for sending or receiving (an SFrame key should never be used for both operations). A key context tracks the key and salt associated to the KID, and the current CTR value. A key context to be used for sending also tracks the next CTR value to be used. The primary operations on an SFrame context are as follows:

• Create an SFrame context: The context is initialized with a ciphersuite and no KID mappings.
• Adding a key for sending: The key and salt are derived from the base key, and used to initialize a send context, together with a zero counter value.
• Adding a key for receiving: The key and salt are derived from the base key, and used to initialize a send context.
• Encrypt a plaintext: Encrypt a given plaintext using the key for a given KID, including the specified metadata.
• Decrypt an SFrame ciphertext: Decrypt an SFrame ciphertext with the KID and CTR values specified in the SFrame Header, and the provided metadata.

shows an example of the types of structures and methods that could be used to create an SFrame API in Rust.

An example SFrame API , salt: Vec, next_counter: Counter, } struct RecvKeyContext { key: Vec, salt: Vec, } struct SFrameContext { cipher_suite: CipherSuite, send_keys: HashMap, recv_keys: HashMap, } trait SFrameContextMethods { fn create(cipher_suite: CipherSuite) -> Self; fn add_send_key(&self, kid: KeyId, base_key: &[u8]); fn add_recv_key(&self, kid: KeyId, base_key: &[u8]); fn encrypt(&mut self, kid: KeyId, metadata: &[u8], plaintext: &[u8]) -> Vec; fn decrypt(&self, metadata: &[u8], ciphertext: &[u8]) -> Vec; } ]]>

Overhead Analysis Any use of SFrame will impose overhead in terms of the amount of bandwidth necessary to transmit a given media stream. Exactly how much overhead will be added depends on several factors:

• How many senders are involved in a conference (length of KID)
• How long the conference has been going on (length of CTR)
• The cipher suite in use (length of authentication tag)
• Whether SFrame is used to encrypt packets, whole frames, or some other unit

Overall, the overhead rate in kilobits per second can be estimated as: OverheadKbps = (1 + |CTR| + |KID| + |TAG|) * 8 * CTPerSecond / 1024 Here the constant value 1 reflects the fixed SFrame header; |CTR| and |KID| reflect the lengths of those fields; |TAG| reflects the cipher overhead; and CTPerSecond reflects the number of SFrame ciphertexts sent per second (e.g., packets or frames per second). In the remainder of this secton, we compute overhead estimates for a collection of common scenarios.

Assumptions In the below calculations, we make conservative assumptions about SFrame overhead, so that the overhead amounts we compute here are likely to be an upper bound on those seen in practice.

Field	Bytes	Explanation
Fixed header	1	Fixed
Key ID (KID)	2	>255 senders; or MLS epoch (E=4) and >16 senders
Counter (CTR)	3	More than 24 hours of media in common cases
Cipher overhead	16	Full GCM tag (longest defined here)

In total, then, we assume that each SFrame encryption will add 22 bytes of overhead. We consider two scenarios, applying SFrame per-frame and per-packet. In each scenario, we compute the SFrame overhead in absolute terms (Kbps) and as a percentage of the base bandwidth.

Audio In audio streams, there is typically a one-to-one relationship between frames and packets, so the overhead is the same whether one uses SFrame at a per-packet or per-frame level. The below table considers three scenarios, based on recommended configurations of the Opus codec :

• Narrow-band speech: 120ms packets, 8Kbps
• Full-band speech: 20ms packets, 32Kbps
• Full-band stereo music: 10ms packets, 128Kbps

SFrame overhead for audio streams

Scenario	fps	Base Kbps	Overhead Kbps	Overhead %
NB speech, 120ms packets	8.3	8	1.4	17.9%
FB speech, 20ms packets	50	32	8.6	26.9%
FB stereo, 10ms packets	100	128	17.2	13.4%

Video Video frames can be larger than an MTU and thus are commonly split across multiple frames. and show the estimated overhead of encrypting a video stream, where SFrame is applied per-frame and per-packet, respectively. The choices of resolution, frames per second, and bandwidth are chosen to roughly reflect the capabilities of modern video codecs across a range from very low to very high quality. SFrame overhead for a video stream encrypted per-frame

Scenario	fps	Base Kbps	Overhead Kbps	Overhead %
426 x 240	7.5	45	1.3	2.9%
640 x 360	15	200	2.6	1.3%
640 x 360	30	400	5.2	1.3%
1280 x 720	30	1500	5.2	0.3%
1920 x 1080	60	7200	10.3	0.1%

SFrame overhead for a video stream encrypted per-packet

Scenario	fps	pps	Base Kbps	Overhead Kbps	Overhead %
426 x 240	7.5	7.5	45	1.3	2.9%
640 x 360	15	30	200	5.2	2.6%
640 x 360	30	60	400	10.3	2.6%
1280 x 720	30	180	1500	30.9	2.1%
1920 x 1080	60	780	7200	134.1	1.9%

In the per-frame case, the SFrame percentage overhead approaches zero as the quality of the video goes up, since bandwidth is driven more by picture size than frame rate. In the per-packet case, the SFrame percentage overhead approaches the ratio between the SFrame overhead per packet and the MTU (here 22 bytes of SFrame overhead divided by an assumed 1200-byte MTU, or about 1.8%).

Conferences Real conferences usually involve several audio and video streams. The overhead of SFrame in such a conference is the aggregate of the overhead over all the individual streams. Thus, while SFrame incurs a large percentage overhead on an audio stream, if the conference also involves a video stream, then the audio overhead is likely negligible relative to the overall bandwidth of the conference. For example, shows the overhead estimates for a two person conference where one person is sending low-quality media and the other sending high-quality. (And we assume that SFrame is applied per-frame.) The video streams dominate the bandwidth at the SFU, so the total bandwidth overhead is only around 1%. SFrame overhead for a two-person conference

Stream	Base Kbps	Overhead Kbps	Overhead %
Participant 1 audio	8	1.4	17.9%
Participant 1 video	45	1.3	2.9%
Participant 2 audio	32	9	26.9%
Participant 2 video	1500	5	0.3%
Total at SFU	1585	16.5	1.0%

SFrame over RTP SFrame is a generic encapsulation format, but many of the applications in which it is likely to be integrated are based on RTP. This section discusses how an integration between SFrame and RTP could be done, and some of the challenges that would need to be overcome. As discussed in , there are two natural patterns for integrating SFrame into an application: applying SFrame per-frame or per-packet. In RTP-based applications, applying SFrame per-packet means that the payload of each RTP packet will be an SFrame ciphertext, starting with an SFrame Header, as shown in . Applying SFrame per-frame means that different RTP payloads will have different formats: The first payload of a frame will contain the SFrame headers, and subsequent payloads will contain further chunks of the ciphertext, as shown in . In order for these media payloads to be properly interpreted by receivers, receivers will need to be configured to know which of the above schemes the sender has applied to a given sequence of RTP packets. SFrame does not provide a mechanism for distributing this configuration information. In applications that use SDP for negotiating RTP media streams , an appropriate extension to SDP could provide this function. Applying SFrame per-frame also requires that packetization and depacketization be done in a generic manner that does not depend on the media content of the packets, since the content being packetized / depacketized will be opaque ciphertext (except for the SFrame header). In order for such a generic packetization scheme to work interoperably one would have to be defined, e.g., as proposed in .

SRTP packet with SFrame-protected payload +--------------------+------------------------------------------+ | | | SFrame header | | | | +--------------------+ | | | | | | | | SFrame encrypted and authenticated payload | | | | | | +->+---------------------------------------------------------------+<-+ | | SRTP authentication tag | | | +---------------------------------------------------------------+ | | | +--- SRTP Encrypted Portion SRTP Authenticated Portion ---+ ]]>

Encryption flow with per-frame encryption for RTP

Test Vectors This section provides a set of test vectors that implementations can use to verify that they correctly implement SFrame encryption and decryption. In addition to test vectors for the overall process of SFrame encryption/decryption, we also provide test vectors for header encoding/decoding, and for AEAD encryption/decryption using the AES-CTR construction defined in . All values are either numeric or byte strings. Numeric values are represented as hex values, prefixed with 0x. Byte strings are represented in hex encoding. Line breaks and whitespace within values are inserted to conform to the width requirements of the RFC format. They should be removed before use. These test vectors are also available in JSON format at . In the JSON test vectors, numeric values are JSON numbers and byte string values are JSON strings containing the hex encoding of the byte strings.

Header encoding/decoding For each case, we provide:

• kid: A KID value
• ctr: A CTR value
• header: An encoded SFrame header

An implementation should verify that:

• Encoding a header with the KID and CTR results in the provided header value
• Decoding the provided header value results in the provided KID and CTR values

AEAD encryption/decryption using AES-CTR and HMAC For each case, we provide:

• cipher_suite: The index of the cipher suite in use (see )
• key: The key input to encryption/decryption
• enc_key: The encryption subkey produced by the derive_subkeys() algorithm
• auth_key: The encryption subkey produced by the derive_subkeys() algorithm
• nonce: The nonce input to encryption/decryption
• aad: The aad input to encryption/decryption
• pt: The plaintext
• ct: The ciphertext

An implementation should verify that the following are true, where AEAD.Encrypt and AEAD.Decrypt are as defined in :

• AEAD.Encrypt(key, nonce, aad, pt) == ct
• AEAD.Decrypt(key, nonce, aad, ct) == pt

The other values in the test vector are intermediate values provided to facilitate debugging of test failures.

SFrame encryption/decryption For each case, we provide:

• cipher_suite: The index of the cipher suite in use (see )
• kid: A KID value
• ctr: A CTR value
• base_key: The base_key input to the derive_key_salt algorithm
• sframe_key_label: The label used to derive sframe_key in the derive_key_salt algorithm
• sframe_salt_label: The label used to derive sframe_salt in the derive_key_salt algorithm
• sframe_secret: The sframe_secret variable in the derive_key_salt algorithm
• sframe_key: The sframe_key value produced by the derive_key_salt algorithm
• sframe_salt: The sframe_salt value produced by the derive_key_salt algorithm
• metadata: The metadata input to the SFrame encrypt algorithm
• pt: The plaintext
• ct: The SFrame ciphertext

An implementation should verify that the following are true, where encrypt and decrypt are as defined in , using an SFrame context initialized with base_key assigned to kid:

• encrypt(ctr, kid, metadata, plaintext) == ct
• decrypt(metadata, ct) == pt

The other values in the test vector are intermediate values provided to facilitate debugging of test failures.