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<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-rats-network-device-subscription-03" category="std" consensus="true" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="RATS Subscription">Attestation Event Stream Subscription</title>

    <author initials="H." surname="Birkholz" fullname="Henk Birkholz">
      <organization abbrev="Fraunhofer SIT">Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>Rheinstrasse 75</street>
          <city>Darmstadt</city>
          <code>64295</code>
          <country>Germany</country>
        </postal>
        <email>henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="E." surname="Voit" fullname="Eric Voit">
      <organization abbrev="Cisco">Cisco Systems, Inc.</organization>
      <address>
        <email>evoit@cisco.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="W." surname="Pan" fullname="Wei Pan">
      <organization abbrev="Huawei">Huawei Technologies</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>101 Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District</street>
          <city>Nanjing, Jiangsu</city>
          <region></region>
          <code>210012</code>
          <country>China</country>
        </postal>
        <phone></phone>
        <email>william.panwei@huawei.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2023" month="March" day="10"/>

    <area>Security</area>
    <workgroup>RATS Working Group</workgroup>
    <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>

    <abstract>


<t>This memo defines how to subscribe to YANG Event Streams for Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS). In RATS, Conceptional Messages, are defined. Analogously, the YANG module defined in this memo augments the YANG module for TPM-based Challenge-Response based Remote Attestation (CHARRA) to allow for subscription to remote attestation Evidence. Additionally, this memo provides the methods and means to define additional Event Streams for other Conceptual Message as illustrated in the RATS Architecture, e.g. Attestation Results, Endorsements, or Event Logs.</t>



    </abstract>



  </front>

  <middle>


<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>

<t><xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest"/> and <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra"/> define the operational prerequisites and a YANG Model for the acquisition of Evidence and other Conceptional Messages from a TPM-based network device. However, there are limitations inherent in the challenge-response based conceptual interaction model (CHARRA <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models"/>) upon which these documents are based. One of these limitation is that it is up to a Verifier to request signed Evidence as provided by <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra"/>, from a separate Attester which contains a TPM. The result is that the interval between the occurrence of a security-relevant change event, and the event's visibility within the interested RATS entity, such as a Verifier or a Relying Party, can be unacceptably long. It is common to convey Conceptual Messages ad-hoc or periodically via requests. As new technologies emerge, some of these solutions require Conceptual Messages to be conveyed from one RATS entity to another without the need of continuous polling. Subscription to YANG Notifications <xref target="RFC8639"/> provides a set of standardized tools to facilitate these emerging requirements. This memo specifies a YANG augment to subscribe to YANG modeled remote attestation Evidence as defined in <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra"/>. Additionally, this memo provides the means to define further Event Streams to convey Conceptional Messages other than Evidence, such as Attestation Results, Endorsements, or Event Logs.</t>

<t>In essence, the limitation of poll-based interactions results in two adverse effects:</t>

<t><list style="numbers">
  <t>Conceptual Messages are not streamed to an interested consumer of information, e.g., Verifiers or Relying Parties, as soon as they are generated.</t>
  <t>If they were to be streamed, Conceptual Messages are not appraisable for their freshness in every scenario. This becomes more important with Conceptional Messages that have a strong dependency on freshness, such as Evidence and corresponding Attestation Results.</t>
</list></t>

<t>This specification addresses the first adverse effect by enabling a consumer of Conceptual Messages (the subscriber) to request a continuous stream of new or updated Conceptual Messages via an <xref target="RFC8639"/> subscription to an &lt;attestation&gt; Event Stream. This new Event Stream is defined in this document and exists upon the producer of Conceptual Messages (the publisher). In the case of a Verifier's subscription to an Attester's Evidence, the Attester will continuously stream a requested set of freshly generated Evidence to the subscribing Verifier.</t>

<t>The second adverse effect results from the use of nonces in the challenge-response interaction model <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models"/> realized in <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra"/>. In <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra"/>, an Attester must wait for a new nonce from a Verifier before it generates a new TPM Quote. To address delays resulting from such a wait, this specification enables freshness to be asserted asynchronously via the streaming attestation interaction model <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models"/>. To convey a RATS Conceptual Message, an initial nonce is provided during the subscription to an Event Stream.</t>

<t>There are several options to refresh a nonce provided by the initial subscription or its freshness characteristics. All of these methods are out-of-band of an established subscription to YANG Notifications. Two complementary methods are taken into account by this memo:</t>

<t><list style="numbers">
  <t>a central provider supplies new fresh nonces, e.g. via a Handle Provider that distributes Epoch IDs to all entities in a domain as described in <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-architecture"/> and as facilitated by the Uni-Directional Remote Attestation described in <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models"/> or</t>
  <t>the freshness characteristics of a received nonce are updated by -- potentially periodic or ad-hoc -- out-of-band TPM Quote requests as facilitated by <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra"/>.</t>
</list></t>

<t>Both approaches to update the freshness characteristics of the Conceptual Messages conveyed via subscription to YANG Notification that are taken into account by this memo assume that clock drift between involved entities can occur. In consequence, in some usage scenarios the timing considerations for freshness <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-architecture"/> might have to be updated in some regular interval. Analogously, there are can be additional methods that are not describe by but nevertheless supported by this memo.</t>

<t>This memo enables to remove the two adverse effects described by using the YANG augment specified. The YANG augment supports, for example, a RATS Verifier to maintain a continuous appraisal procedure of verifiably fresh Attester Evidence without relying on continuous polling.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="terminology"><name>Terminology</name>

<t>The following terms are imported from <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-architecture"/>: Attester, Conceptual Message, Evidence, Relying Party, and Verifier.  Also imported are the time definitions time(VG), time(NS), time(EG), time(RG), and time(RA) from that document's Appendix A.  The following terms are imported from <xref target="RFC8639"/>: Event Stream, Subscription, Publisher, Event Stream Filter, Dynamic Subscription.</t>

<section anchor="requirements-notation"><name>Requirements Notation</name>

<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 <xref target="RFC8174">RFC2119</xref> when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="operational-model"><name>Operational Model</name>

<t><xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest"/> describes the conveyance of TPM-based Evidence from a Verifier to an Attester using the CHARRA interaction model <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models"/>. The operational model and corresponding sequence diagram described in this section is based on <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra"/>. The basis for interoperability required for additional types of Event Streams is covered in <xref target="otherstreams"/>. The following sub-section focuses on subscription to YANG Notifications to the &lt;attestation&gt; Event Stream.</t>

<section anchor="sequence-diagram"><name>Sequence Diagram</name>

<t><xref target="sequence"/> below is a sequence diagram which updates Figure 5 of <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest"/>. This sequence diagram replaces the <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest"/> TPM-specific challenge-response interaction model with a <xref target="RFC8639"/> Dynamic Subscription to an &lt;attestation&gt; Event Stream. The contents of the &lt;attestation&gt; Event Stream are defined below within <xref target="attestationstream"/>.</t>

<figure title="YANG Subscription Model for Remote Attestation" anchor="sequence"><artwork><![CDATA[
.----------.                            .--------------------------.
| Attester |                            | Relying Party / Verifier |
'----------'                            '--------------------------'
   time(VG)                                                    |
generateClaims(targetEnvironment)                              |
     | => claims, eventLogs                                    |
     |                                                         |
     |<---------establish-subscription(<attestation>)------time(NS)
     |                                                         |
   time(EG)                                                    |
generateEvidence(nonce, PcrSelection, collectedClaims)         |
     | => SignedPcrEvidence(nonce, PcrSelection)               |
     | => LogEvidence(collectedClaims)                         |
     |                                                         |
     |--filter(<pcr-extend>)---------------------------------->|
     |--<tpm12-attestation> or <tpm20-attestation>------------>|
     |                                                         |
     |                                                  time(RG,RA)
     |     appraiseEvidence(SignedPcrEvidence, eventLog, refClaims)
     |                                    attestationResult <= |
     |                                                         |
     ~                                                         ~
   time(VG')                                                   |
generateClaimes(targetEnvironment)                             |
     | => claims                                               |
     |                                                         |
   time(EG')                                                   |
generateEvidence(handle, PcrSelection, collectedClaims)        |
     | => SignedPcrEvidence(nonce, PcrSelection)               |
     | => LogEvidence(collectedClaims)                         |
     |                                                         |
     |--filter(<pcr-extend>)---------------------------------->|
     |--<tpm12-attestation> or <tpm20-attestation>------------>|
     |                                                         |
     |                                                 time(RG',RA')
     |    appraiseEvidence(SignedPcrEvidence, eventLog, refClaims)
     |                                    attestationResult <= |
     |                                                         |
]]></artwork></figure>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>time(VG,RG,RA) are identical to the corresponding time definitions from <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest"/>.</t>
  <t>time(VG',RG',RA') are subsequent instances of the corresponding times from Figure 5 in <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest"/>.</t>
  <t>time(NS) – the subscriber generates a nonce and makes an <xref target="RFC8639"/> &lt;establish-subscription&gt; request based on a nonce. This request also includes the augmentations defined in this document's YANG model. Key subscription RPC parameters include:
  <list style="symbols">
      <t>the nonce,</t>
      <t>a set of PCRs of interest which the  wants to appraise, and</t>
      <t>an optional filter which can reduce the logged events on the &lt;attestation&gt; stream pushed to the Verifier.</t>
    </list></t>
  <t>time(EG) – an initial response of Evidence is returned to the Verifier. This includes:
  <list style="symbols">
      <t>a replay of filtered log entries which have extended into a PCR of interest since boot are sent in the &lt;pcr-extend&gt; notification, and</t>
      <t>a signed TPM quote that contains at least the PCRs from the &lt;establish-subscription&gt; RPC are included in a &lt;tpm12-attestation&gt; or &lt;tpm20-attestation&gt;). This quote must have included the nonce provided at time(NS).</t>
    </list></t>
  <t>time(VG',EG') – this occurs when a PCR is extended subsequent to time(EG). Immediately after the extension, the following information needs to be pushed to the Verifier:
  <list style="symbols">
      <t>any values extended into a PCR of interest,</t>
      <t>a signed TPM Quote showing the result the PCR extension, and</t>
      <t>and a handle (see Section 6. in <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models"/>, which is either the initially received nonce or a more recently received Epoch ID (see Section 10.3. in <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-architecture"/> that contains a new nonce or equivalent qualified data.</t>
    </list></t>
</list></t>

<t>One way to acquire a new time synchronisation that allows for the reuse of the initially received nonce as a fresh handle is elaborated on in the follow section <xref target="freshness-handles"/>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="freshness-handles"><name>Continuously Verifying Freshness</name>

<t>As there is no new Verifier nonce provided at time(EG'), it is important to validate the freshness of TPM Quotes which are delivered at that time.  The method of doing this verification will vary based on the capabilities of the TPM cryptoprocessor used.</t>

<section anchor="tpm-12-quote"><name>TPM 1.2 Quote</name>

<t>The <xref target="RFC8639"/> notification format includes the &lt;eventTime&gt; object.  This can be used to determine the amount of time subsequent to the initial subscription each notification was sent.  However this time is not part of the signed results which are returned from the Quote, and therefore is not trustworthy as objects returned in the Quote.  Therefore a Verifier MUST periodically issue a new nonce, and receive this nonce within a TPM quote response in order to ensure the freshness of the results.  This can be done using the &lt;tpm12-challenge-response-attestation&gt; RPC from <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra"/>.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="tpm-2-quote"><name>TPM 2 Quote</name>

<t>When the Attester includes a TPM2 compliant cryptoprocessor, internal time-related counters are included within the signed TPM Quote.  By including a initial nonce in the <xref target="RFC8639"/> subscription request, fresh values for these counters are pushed as part of the first TPM Quote returned to the Verifier. And then as shown by <xref target="I-D.birkholz-rats-tuda"/>, subsequent TPM Quotes delivered to the Verifier can the be appraised for freshness based on the predictable incrementing of these time-related countersr.</t>

<t>The relevant internal time-related counters defined within <xref target="TPM2.0"/> can be seen within &lt;tpms-clock-info&gt;.   These counters include the &lt;clock&gt;, &lt;reset-counter&gt;, and &lt;restart-counter&gt; objects.  The rules for appraising these objects are as follows:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>If the &lt;clock&gt; has incremented for no more than the same duration as both the &lt;eventTime&gt; and the Verifier's internal time since the initial time(EG) and any previous time(EG'), then the TPM Quote may be considered fresh. Note that <xref target="TPM2.0"/> allows for +/- 15% clock drift.  However many chips significantly improve on this maximum drift.  If available, chip specific maximum drifts SHOULD be considered during the appraisal process.</t>
  <t>If the &lt;reset-counter&gt;, &lt;restart-counter&gt; has incremented.  The existing subscription MUST be terminated, and a new &lt;establish-subscription&gt; SHOULD be generated.</t>
  <t>If a TPM Quote on any subscribed PCR has not been pushed to the Verifier for a duration of an Attester defined heartbeat interval, then a new TPM Quote notification should be sent to the Verifier.  This may often be the case, as certain PCRs might be infrequently updated.</t>
</list></t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
.----------.                        .--------------------------.
| Attester |                        | Relying Party / Verifier |
'----------'                        '--------------------------'
   time(VG',EG')                                         |
     |-<tpm20-attestation>------------------------------>|
     |                                    :              |
     ~                           Heartbeat interval      ~
     |                                    :              |
   time(EG')                              :              |
     |-<tpm20-attestation>------------------------------>|
     |                                                   |
]]></artwork></figure>

</section>
</section>
</section>
<section anchor="attestationstream"><name>Remote Attestation Event Stream</name>

<t>The &lt;attestation&gt; Event Stream is an <xref target="RFC8639"/> compliant Event Stream which is defined within this section and within the YANG Module of <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra"/>. This Event Stream contains YANG notifications which carry Evidence to assists a Verifier in appraising the Trustworthiness Level of an Attester. Data Nodes within <xref target="configuring"/> allow the configuration of this Event Stream’s contents on an Attester.</t>

<t>This &lt;attestation&gt; Event Stream may only be exposed on Attesters supporting <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest"/>. As with <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest"/>, it is up to the Verifier to understand which types of cryptoprocessors and keys are acceptable.</t>

<section anchor="subscription-to-the-attestation-event-stream"><name>Subscription to the &lt;attestation&gt; Event Stream</name>

<t>To establish a subscription to an Attester in a way which provides provably fresh Evidence, initial randomness must be provided to the Attester. This is done via the augmentation of a &lt;nonce-value&gt; into <xref target="RFC8639"/> the &lt;establish-subscription&gt; RPC. Additionally, a Verifier must ask for PCRs of interest from a platform.</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
  augment /sn:establish-subscription/sn:input:
    +---w nonce-value    binary
    +---w pcr-index*     tpm:pcr
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>The result of the subscription will be that passing of the following information:</t>

<t><list style="numbers">
  <t>&lt;tpm12-attestation&gt; and &lt;tpm20-attestation&gt; notifications which include the provided &lt;nonce-value&gt;.  These attestation notifications MUST at least include all the &lt;pcr-indicies&gt; requested in the RPC.</t>
  <t>a series of &lt;pcr-extend&gt; notifications which reference the requested PCRs on all TPM based cryptoprocessors on the Attester.</t>
  <t>&lt;tpm12-attestation&gt; and &lt;tpm20-attestation&gt; notifications generated within a few seconds of the &lt;pcr-extend&gt; notifications.  These attestation notifications MUST at least include any PCRs extended.</t>
</list></t>

<t>If the Verifier does not want to see the logged extend operations for all PCRs available from an Attester, an Event Stream Filter should be applied.  This filter will remove Evidence from any PCRs which are not interesting to the Verifier.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="replaying-a-history-of-previous-tpm-extend-operations"><name>Replaying a history of previous TPM extend operations</name>

<t>Unless it is relying on Known Good Values, a Verifier will need to acquire a history of PCR extensions since the Attester has been booted.  This history may be requested from the Attester as part of the &lt;establish-subscription&gt; RPC.  This request is accomplished by placing a very old &lt;replay-start-time&gt; within the original RPC request.  As the very old &lt;replay-start-time&gt; will pre-date the time of Attester boot, a &lt;replay-start-time-revision&gt; will be returned in the &lt;establish-subscription&gt; RPC response, indicating when the Attester booted.  Immediately following the response (and before the notifications above)  one or more &lt;pcr-extend&gt; notifications which document all extend operations which have occurred for the requested PCRs since boot will be sent.  Many extend operations to a single PCR index on a single TPM SHOULD be included within a single notification.</t>

<t>Note that if a Verifier has a partial history of extensions, the &lt;replay-start-time&gt; can be adjusted so that known extensions are not forwarded.</t>

<t>The end of this history replay will be indicated with the <xref target="RFC8639"/> &lt;replay-completed&gt; notification.  For more on this sequence, see Section 2.4.2.1 of <xref target="RFC8639"/>.</t>

<t>After the &lt;replay-complete&gt; notification is provided, a TPM Quote will be requested and the result passed to the Verifier via a &lt;tpm12-attestation&gt; and &lt;tpm20-attestation&gt; notification.  If there have been any additional extend operations which have changed a subscribed PCR value in this quote, these MUST be pushed to the Verifier before the &lt;tpm12-attestation&gt; and &lt;tpm20-attestation&gt; notification.</t>

<t>At this point the Verifier has sufficient Evidence appraise the reported extend operations for each PCR, as well compare the expected value of the PCR value against that signed by the TPM.</t>

<section anchor="tpm2-heartbeat"><name>TPM2 Heartbeat</name>

<t>For TPM2, make sure that every requested PCR is sent within an &lt;tpm20-attestation&gt; no less frequently than once per heartbeat interval.   This MAY be done with a single &lt;tpm20-attestation&gt; notification that includes all requested PCRs every heartbeat interval.  This MAY be done with several &lt;tpm20-attestation&gt; notifications at different times during that heartbeat interval.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="yang-notifications-placed-on-the-attestation-event-stream"><name>YANG notifications placed on the &lt;attestation&gt; Event Stream</name>

<section anchor="pcr-extend"><name>pcr-extend</name>

<t>This notification documents when a subscribed PCR is extended within a single TPM cryptoprocessor.  It SHOULD be emmitted no less than the &lt;marshalling-period&gt; after an the PCR is first extended.  (The reason for the marshalling is that it is quite possible that multiple extensions to the same PCR have been made in quick succession, and these should be reflected in the same notification.)  This notification MUST be emmitted prior to a &lt;tpm12-attestation&gt; or &lt;tpm20-attestation&gt; notification which has included and signed the results of any specific PCR extension.   If pcr extending events occur during the generation of the &lt;tpm12-attestation&gt; or &lt;tpm20-attestation&gt; notification, the marshalling period MUST be extended so that a new &lt;pcr-extend&gt; is not sent until the corresponding notifications have been sent.</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
+---n pcr-extend
   +--ro certificate-name     certificate-name-ref
   +--ro pcr-index-changed*   tpm:pcr
   +--ro attested-event* []
      +--ro attested-event
         +--ro extended-with             binary
         +--ro (event-details)?
            +--:(bios-event-log) {tpm:bios}?
            |  +--ro bios-event-entry* [event-number]
            |     +--ro event-number    uint32
            |     +--ro event-type?     uint32
            |     +--ro pcr-index?      pcr
            |     +--ro digest-list* []
            |     |  +--ro hash-algo?   identityref
            |     |  +--ro digest*      binary
            |     +--ro event-size?     uint32
            |     +--ro event-data*     uint8
            +--:(ima-event-log) {tpm:ima}?
            |  +--ro ima-event-entry* [event-number]
            |     +--ro event-number               uint64
            |     +--ro ima-template?              string
            |     +--ro filename-hint?             string
            |     +--ro filedata-hash?             binary
            |     +--ro filedata-hash-algorithm?   string
            |     +--ro template-hash-algorithm?   string
            |     +--ro template-hash?             binary
            |     +--ro pcr-index?                 pcr
            |     +--ro signature?                 binary
            +--:(netequip-boot-event-log) {tpm:netequip_boot}?
               +--ro boot-event-entry* [event-number]
                  +--ro event-number               uint64
                  +--ro ima-template?              string
                  +--ro filename-hint?             string
                  +--ro filedata-hash?             binary
                  +--ro filedata-hash-algorithm?   string
                  +--ro template-hash-algorithm?   string
                  +--ro template-hash?             binary
                  +--ro pcr-index?                 pcr
                  +--ro signature?                 binary
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>Each &lt;pcr-extend&gt; MUST include one or more values being extended into the PCR.   These are passed within the &lt;extended-with&gt; object.  For each extension, details of the event SHOULD be provided within the &lt;event-details&gt; object.
The format of any included &lt;event-details&gt; is identified by the &lt;event-type&gt;.  This document includes two YANG structures which may be inserted into the &lt;event-details&gt;.  These two structures are: &lt;ima-event-log&gt; and &lt;bios-event-log&gt;.  Implementations wanting to provide additional documentation of a type of PCR extension may choose to define additional YANG structures which can be placed into &lt;event-details&gt;.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="tpm12-attestation"><name>tpm12-attestation</name>

<t>This notification contains an instance of a TPM1.2 style signed cryptoprocessor measurement. It is supplemented by Attester information which is not signed. This notification is generated and emitted from an Attester when at least one PCR identified within the subscribed &lt;pcr-indices&gt; has changed from the previous &lt;tpm12-attestation&gt; notification.  This notification MUST NOT include the results of any PCR extensions not previously reported by a &lt;pcr-extend&gt;.  This notification SHOULD be emitted as soon as a TPM Quote can extract the latest PCR hashed values.  This notification MUST be emitted prior to a subsequent &lt;pcr-extend&gt;.</t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
    +---n tpm12-attestation {taa:TPM12}?
       +--ro certificate-name       tpm:certificate-name-ref
       +--ro up-time?               uint32
       +--ro TPM_QUOTE2?            binary
       +--ro TPM12-hash-algo?       identityref
       +--ro unsigned-pcr-values* []
          +--ro pcr-index*   tpm:pcr
          +--ro pcr-value*   binary
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>All YANG objects above are defined within <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra"/>.  The &lt;tpm12-attestation&gt; is not replayable.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="tpm20-attestation"><name>tpm20-attestation</name>

<t>This notification contains an instance of TPM2 style signed cryptoprocessor measurements. It is supplemented by Attester information which is not signed. This notification is generated at two points in time:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>every time at least one PCR has changed from a previous tpm20-attestation. In this case, the notification SHOULD be emitted within 10 seconds of the corresponding &lt;pcr-extend&gt; being sent:</t>
  <t>after a locally configurable minimum heartbeat period since a previous tpm20-attestation was sent.</t>
</list></t>

<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
    +---n tpm20-attestation {taa:TPM20}?
       +--ro certificate-name       tpm:certificate-name-ref
       +--ro TPMS_QUOTE_INFO        binary
       +--ro quote-signature?       binary
       +--ro up-time?               uint32
       +--ro unsigned-pcr-values* []
          +--ro TPM20-hash-algo?   identityref
          +--ro pcr-values* [pcr-index]
             +--ro pcr-index    pcr
             +--ro pcr-value?   binary
]]></artwork></figure>

<t>All YANG objects above are defined within <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra"/>.  The &lt;tpm20-attestation&gt; is not replayable.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="filtering-evidence-at-the-attester"><name>Filtering Evidence at the Attester</name>

<t>It can be useful <em>not</em> to receive all Evidence related to a PCR.  An example of this is would be a when a Verifier maintains known good values of a PCR.  In this case, it is not necessary to send each extend operation.</t>

<t>To accomplish this reduction, when an RFC8639 &lt;establish-subscription&gt; RPC is sent, a &lt;stream-filter&gt; as per RFC8639, Section 2.2 can be set to discard a &lt;pcr-extend&gt;  notification when the &lt;pcr-index-changed&gt; is uninteresting to the verifier.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="replaying-previous-pcr-extend-events"><name>Replaying previous PCR Extend events</name>

<t>To verify the value of a PCR, a Verifier must either know that the value is a known good value <xref target="KGV"/> or be able to reconstruct the hash value by viewing all the PCR-Extends since the Attester rebooted. Wherever a hash reconstruction might be needed, the &lt;attestation&gt; Event Stream MUST support the RFC8639 &lt;replay&gt; feature. Through the &lt;replay&gt; feature, it is possible for a Verifier to retrieve and sequentially hash all of the PCR extending events since an Attester booted. And thus, the Verifier has access to all the evidence needed to verify a PCR’s current value.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="configuring"><name>Configuring the &lt;attestation&gt; Event Stream</name>

<t><xref target="attestationconfig"/> is tree diagram which exposes the operator configurable elements of the &lt;attestation&gt; Event Stream. This allows an Attester to select what information should be available on the stream. A fetch operation also allows an external device such as a Verifier to understand the current configuration of stream.</t>

<t>Almost all YANG objects below are defined via reference from <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra"/>. There is one object which is new with this model however. &lt;tpm2-heartbeat&gt; defines the maximum amount of time which should pass before a subscriber to the Event Stream should get a &lt;tpm20-attestation&gt; notification from devices which contain a TPM2.</t>

<figure title="Configuring the \&lt;attestation\&gt; Event Stream" anchor="attestationconfig"><artwork><![CDATA[
  augment /tpm:rats-support-structures:
    +--rw tras:marshalling-period?                  uint8
    +--rw tras:tpm12-subscribed-signature-scheme?
    |   -> ../tpm:attester-supported-algos/tpm12-asymmetric-signing
    |      {taa:TPM12}?
    +--rw tras:tpm20-subscribed-signature-scheme?
    |   -> ../tpm:attester-supported-algos/tpm20-asymmetric-signing
    |      {taa:TPM20}?
    +--rw tras:tpm20-subscription-heartbeat?        uint16
           {taa:TPM20}?
  
  augment /tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms:
     +--rw tras:subscription-aik?        tpm:certificate-name-ref
     +--rw (tras:subscribable)?
        +--:(tras:tpm12-stream) {taa:tpm12}?
        |  +--rw tras:tpm12-hash-algo?   identityref
        |  +--rw tras:tpm12-pcr-index*   tpm:pcr
        +--:(tras:tpm20-stream) {taa:tpm20}?
           +--rw tras:tpm20-hash-algo?   identityref
           +--rw tras:tpm20-pcr-index*   tpm:pcr
]]></artwork></figure>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="YANG-Module"><name>YANG Module</name>

<t>This YANG module imports modules from <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra"/> and <xref target="RFC8639"/>.  It is also work-in-progress.</t>

<figure><sourcecode type="YANG"><![CDATA[
<CODE BEGINS> ietf-rats-attestation-stream@2021-05-11.yang
module ietf-tpm-remote-attestation-stream {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace 
     "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation-stream";
  prefix tras;

  import ietf-subscribed-notifications { 
    prefix sn;
    reference
      "RFC 8639: Subscription to YANG Notifications";    
  }
  import ietf-tpm-remote-attestation { 
    prefix tpm; 
    reference  
      "draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra";  
  } 
  import ietf-tcg-algs {
    prefix taa;
  }
   
  organization "IETF";
  contact
    "WG Web:   <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/rats/>
     WG List:  <mailto:rats@ietf.org>
     Editor:   Eric Voit
               <mailto:evoit@cisco.com>";
               
  description
    "This module contains conceptual YANG specifications for  
     subscribing to attestation streams being generated from TPM chips.
    
     Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified
     as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
     Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
     or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
     subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
     BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
     Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
     (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
     This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
     (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC
     itself for full legal notices.";
  
  revision 2021-05-11 {
    description
      "Initial version.";    
    reference 
      "draft-birkholz-rats-network-device-subscription";
  }
   
  /*
   * IDENTITIES
   */
   
  identity pcr-unsubscribable {
    base sn:establish-subscription-error;
    description
      "Requested PCR is subscribable by the Attester.";
  }
  
  
  /*
   * Groupings
   */ 

  grouping heartbeat {
    description
      "Allows an Attester to push verifiable, current TPM PCR values 
      even when there have been no recent changes to PCRs.";    
    leaf tpm20-subscription-heartbeat {
      type uint16;
      description
        "Number of seconds before the Attestation stream should send a 
        new notification with a fresh quote.  This allows confirmation 
        that the PCR values haven't changed since the last 
        tpm20-attestation.";
    }
  }
  
  
  /*
   * RPCs
   */ 
  
  augment "/sn:establish-subscription/sn:input" {
    when 'derived-from-or-self(sn:stream, "attestation")';
    description
      "This augmentation adds a nonce to as a subscription parameters
       that apply specifically to datastore updates to RPC input.";
    uses tpm:nonce;
    leaf-list pcr-index {
      type tpm:pcr;
      min-elements 1;
      description
        "The numbers/indexes of the PCRs. This will act as a filter for  
        the subscription so that 'tpm-extend' notifications related to 
        non-requested PCRs will not be sent to a subscriber.";
    }
  }
  
  /*
   * NOTIFICATIONS
   */  

  notification pcr-extend {
    description
      "This notification indicates that one or more PCRs have been
      extended within a TPM based cryptoprocessor.  In less than the 
      'marshalling-period', it MUST be followed with either a 
      corresponding tpm12-attestation or tpm20-attestation notification 
      which exposes the result of the PCRs updated.";
    uses tpm:certificate-name-ref;
    leaf-list pcr-index-changed {
      type tpm:pcr;
      min-elements 1;
      description
        "The number of each PCR extended.  This list MUST contain the
        set of PCRs descibed within the event log details.  This leaf
        can be derived from the list of attested events, but exposing
        it here allows for easy filtering of the notifications of 
        interest to a verifier.";
    }
    list attested-event {
      description
        "A set of events which extended an Attester PCR.  The sequence  
        of elements represented in list must match the sequence of   
        events placed into the TPM's PCR.";
      container attested-event {
        description
          "An instance of an event which extended an Attester PCR";
        leaf extended-with {
          type binary;
          mandatory true;
          description
            "Information extending the PCR.";
        }
        choice event-details {
          description
            "Contains the event happened the Attester thought  
            was worthy of recording in a PCR.
            
            choices are of types defined by the identityref 
            base tpm:attested_event_log_type";      
          case bios-event-log {
            if-feature "tpm:bios";
            description
              "BIOS/UEFI event log format";
            uses tpm:bios-event-log;
          }
          case ima-event-log {
            if-feature "tpm:ima";
            description
              "IMA event log format";
            uses tpm:ima-event-log;
          }
          case netequip-boot-event-log {
            if-feature "tpm:netequip_boot";
            description
              "IMA event log format";
            uses tpm:network-equipment-boot-event-log;
          }
        }       
      }
    }
  }  

  notification tpm12-attestation {
    if-feature "taa:tpm12";
    description
      "Contains an instance of TPM1.2 style signed cryptoprocessor 
      measurements.  It is supplemented by unsigned Attester 
      information.";   
    leaf certificate-name {
      type tpm:certificate-name-ref;
      mandatory true;
      description
        "Allows a TPM quote to be associated with a certificate.";
    } 
    uses tpm:tpm12-attestation;
    uses tpm:tpm12-hash-algo;
    list unsigned-pcr-values {
      description  
        "Allows notifications to be filtered by PCR number or
        PCR value based on via YANG related mechanisms such as PATH.
        This is done without requiring the filtering structure to be
        applied against TCG structured data.";  
      leaf-list pcr-index {
        type tpm:pcr;
        min-elements 1;
        description
          "PCR index number.";
      }
      leaf-list pcr-value {
        type binary;
        description
          "PCR value in a sequence which matches to the 'pcr-index'.";
      }
    }
  }

  notification tpm20-attestation {
    if-feature "taa:tpm20";
    description
      "Contains an instance of TPM2 style signed cryptoprocessor 
      measurements.  It is supplemented by unsigned Attester 
      information.";      
    leaf certificate-name {
      type tpm:certificate-name-ref;
      mandatory true;
      description
        "Allows a TPM quote to be associated with a certificate.";
    }            
    uses tpm:tpm20-attestation {
      description  
        "Provides the attestation info.  Also ensures PCRs can be XPATH 
        filtered by refining the unsigned data so that it appears.";
      refine unsigned-pcr-values {
        min-elements 1;
      }
      refine unsigned-pcr-values/pcr-values {
        min-elements 1;
      }
    }
  }  


  /*
   * DATA NODES
   */  

  augment "/tpm:rats-support-structures" {
    description
      "Defines platform wide 'attestation' stream subscription 
      parameters.";   
    leaf marshalling-period { 
      type uint8;
      default 5;
      description
        "The maximum number of seconds between the time an event  
        extends a PCR, and the 'tpm-extend' notification which reports 
        it to a subscribed Verifier.  This period allows multiple 
        extend operations bundled together and handled as a group.";  
    }
    leaf tpm12-subscribed-signature-scheme {
      if-feature "taa:tpm12";
      type leafref {
        path "../tpm:attester-supported-algos" +
               "/tpm:tpm12-asymmetric-signing"; 
      }
      description
        "A single signature-scheme which will be used to sign the  
        evidence from a TPM 1.2. which is then placed onto the 
        'attestation' event stream.";
    }
    leaf tpm20-subscribed-signature-scheme {
      if-feature "taa:tpm20";
      type leafref {
        path "../tpm:attester-supported-algos" +
               "/tpm:tpm20-asymmetric-signing"; 
      }
      description
        "A single signature-scheme which will be used to sign the  
        evidence from a TPM 2.0. which is then placed onto the 
        'attestation' event stream.";
    }    
    uses heartbeat{
      if-feature "taa:tpm20";
    }
  }
  
  augment "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms" {
    description
      "Allows the configuration 'attestation' stream parameters for a 
      TPM.";  
    leaf subscription-aik {
      type tpm:certificate-name-ref;
      description 
        "Identifies the certificate-name associated with the 
        notifications in the 'attestation' stream.";
    }
    choice subscribable {
      config true;
      description
        "Indicates that the set of notifications which comprise the  
        'attestation' event stream can be modified or tuned by a 
        network administrator.";
      case tpm12-stream {
        if-feature "taa:tpm12";
        description
          "Configuration elements for a TPM1.2 event stream.";
        uses tpm:tpm12-hash-algo;
        leaf-list tpm12-pcr-index {
          type tpm:pcr;
          description
            "The numbers/indexes of the PCRs which can be subscribed.";
        }
      }
      case tpm20-stream {
        if-feature "taa:tpm20";
        description
          "Configuration elements for a TPM2.0 event stream.";
        uses tpm:tpm20-hash-algo;
        leaf-list tpm20-pcr-index {
          type tpm:pcr;
          description
            "The numbers/indexes of the PCRs which can be subscribed.";
        }
      }
    }
  }  
}
<CODE ENDS>
]]></sourcecode></figure>

</section>
<section anchor="otherstreams"><name>Event Streams for Conceptual Messages</name>

<t>Analogous to the <xref target="RFC8639"/> compliant &lt;attestation&gt; Event Stream for the conveyance of remote attestation Evidence as defined in Section <xref target="attestationstream"/>, additional Event Streams can be defined for this YANG augment. Additional Event Streams require separate YANG augment specifications that provide the Event Stream definition and optionally a content format definition either via subscriptions to YANG datastores or dedicated YANG Notifications. It is possible to use either YANG subscription methods to other YANG modules for RATS Conceptual Messages or to define Event Streams for other none-YANG-modeled data. In the context of RATS Conceptual Messages, both options MUST be a specified via YANG augments to this specification.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="security-considerations"><name>Security Considerations</name>

<t>To be written.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="IANA"><name>IANA Considerations</name>

<t>To be written.</t>

</section>


  </middle>

  <back>


    <references title='Normative References'>




<reference anchor='I-D.ietf-rats-architecture'>
   <front>
      <title>Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture</title>
      <author fullname='Henk Birkholz'>
	 <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Dave Thaler'>
	 <organization>Microsoft</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Michael Richardson'>
	 <organization>Sandelman Software Works</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Ned Smith'>
	 <organization>Intel Corporation</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Wei Pan'>
	 <organization>Huawei Technologies</organization>
      </author>
      <date day='16' month='August' year='2022'/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   In network protocol exchanges it is often useful for one end of a
   communication to know whether the other end is in an intended
   operating state.  This document provides an architectural overview of
   the entities involved that make such tests possible through the
   process of generating, conveying, and evaluating evidentiary claims.
   An attempt is made to provide for a model that is neutral toward
   processor architectures, the content of claims, and protocols.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-ietf-rats-architecture-21'/>
   <format target='https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-rats-architecture-21.txt' type='TXT'/>
</reference>


<reference anchor='I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest'>
   <front>
      <title>TPM-based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification</title>
      <author fullname='Guy Fedorkow'>
	 <organization>Juniper Networks, Inc.</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Eric Voit'>
	 <organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Jessica Fitzgerald-McKay'>
	 <organization>National Security Agency</organization>
      </author>
      <date day='22' month='March' year='2022'/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document describes a workflow for remote attestation of the
   integrity of firmware and software installed on network devices that
   contain Trusted Platform Modules [TPM1.2], [TPM2.0], as defined by
   the Trusted Computing Group (TCG)), or equivalent hardware
   implementations that include the protected capabilities, as provided
   by TPMs.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest-14'/>
   <format target='https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest-14.txt' type='TXT'/>
</reference>


<reference anchor='I-D.ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra'>
   <front>
      <title>A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote Attestation Procedures using TPMs</title>
      <author fullname='Henk Birkholz'>
	 <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Michael Eckel'>
	 <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Shwetha Bhandari'>
	 <organization>ThoughtSpot</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Eric Voit'>
	 <organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Bill Sulzen'>
	 <organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Liang Xia (Frank)'>
	 <organization>Huawei Technologies</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Tom Laffey'>
	 <organization>Hewlett Packard Enterprise</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Guy C. Fedorkow'>
	 <organization>Juniper Networks</organization>
      </author>
      <date day='18' month='May' year='2022'/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document defines YANG RPCs and a few configuration nodes
   required to retrieve attestation evidence about integrity
   measurements from a device, following the operational context defined
   in TPM-based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification.
   Complementary measurement logs are also provided by the YANG RPCs,
   originating from one or more roots of trust for measurement (RTMs).
   The module defined requires at least one TPM 1.2 or TPM 2.0 as well
   as a corresponding TPM Software Stack (TSS), or equivalent hardware
   implementations that include the protected capabilities as provided
   by TPMs as well as a corresponding software stack, included in the
   device components of the composite device the YANG server is running
   on.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra-21'/>
   <format target='https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra-21.txt' type='TXT'/>
</reference>


<reference anchor='I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models'>
   <front>
      <title>Reference Interaction Models for Remote Attestation Procedures</title>
      <author fullname='Henk Birkholz'>
	 <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Michael Eckel'>
	 <organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Wei Pan'>
	 <organization>Huawei Technologies</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Eric Voit'>
	 <organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
      </author>
      <date day='26' month='January' year='2022'/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document describes interaction models for remote attestation
   procedures (RATS).  Three conveying mechanisms -- Challenge/Response,
   Uni-Directional, and Streaming Remote Attestation -- are illustrated
   and defined.  Analogously, a general overview about the information
   elements typically used by corresponding conveyance protocols are
   highlighted.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models-05'/>
   <format target='https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models-05.txt' type='TXT'/>
</reference>



<reference anchor='RFC8639' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8639'>
<front>
<title>Subscription to YANG Notifications</title>
<author fullname='E. Voit' initials='E.' surname='Voit'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='A. Clemm' initials='A.' surname='Clemm'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='A. Gonzalez Prieto' initials='A.' surname='Gonzalez Prieto'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='E. Nilsen-Nygaard' initials='E.' surname='Nilsen-Nygaard'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='A. Tripathy' initials='A.' surname='Tripathy'><organization/></author>
<date month='September' year='2019'/>
<abstract><t>This document defines a YANG data model and associated mechanisms enabling subscriber-specific subscriptions to a publisher's event streams.  Applying these elements allows a subscriber to request and receive a continuous, customized feed of publisher-generated information.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='8639'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC8639'/>
</reference>



<reference anchor='RFC8174' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174'>
<front>
<title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
<author fullname='B. Leiba' initials='B.' surname='Leiba'><organization/></author>
<date month='May' year='2017'/>
<abstract><t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol  specifications.  This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the  defined special meanings.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='BCP' value='14'/>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='8174'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC8174'/>
</reference>


<reference anchor="TPM2.0" target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-library-specification/">
  <front>
    <title>TPM 2.0 Library Specification</title>
    <author >
      <organization>TCG</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="n.d."/>
  </front>
</reference>


    </references>

    <references title='Informative References'>




<reference anchor='I-D.birkholz-rats-tuda'>
   <front>
      <title>Time-Based Uni-Directional Attestation</title>
      <author fullname='Andreas Fuchs'>
	 <organization>Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Henk Birkholz'>
	 <organization>Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Ira E McDonald'>
	 <organization>High North Inc</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname='Carsten Bormann'>
	 <organization>Universität Bremen TZI</organization>
      </author>
      <date day='10' month='July' year='2022'/>
      <abstract>
	 <t>   This document defines the method and bindings used to convey Evidence
   via Time-based Uni-Directional Attestation (TUDA) in Remote
   ATtestation procedureS (RATS).  TUDA does not require a challenge-
   response handshake and thereby does not rely on the conveyance of a
   nonce to prove freshness of remote attestation Evidence.  TUDA
   enables the creation of Secure Audit Logs that can constitute
   believable Evidence about both current and past operational states of
   an Attester.  In TUDA, RATS entities require access to a Handle
   Distributor to which a trustable and synchronized time-source is
   available.  The Handle Distributor takes on the role of a Time Stamp
   Authority (TSA) to distribute Handles incorporating Time Stamp Tokens
   (TST) to the RATS entities.  RATS require an Attesting Environment
   that generates believable Evidence.  While a TPM is used as the
   corresponding root of trust in this specification, any other type of
   root of trust can be used with TUDA.

	 </t>
      </abstract>
   </front>
   <seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-birkholz-rats-tuda-07'/>
   <format target='https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-birkholz-rats-tuda-07.txt' type='TXT'/>
</reference>


<reference anchor="KGV" target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-NetEq-Attestation-Workflow-Outline_v1r9b_pubrev.pdf">
  <front>
    <title>KGV</title>
    <author >
      <organization>TCG</organization>
    </author>
    <date year="2003" month="October"/>
  </front>
</reference>


    </references>


<section anchor="change-log"><name>Change Log</name>

<t>v00-v03</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t>minor updates as Charra goes through IESG.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section numbered="no" anchor="acknowledgements"><name>Acknowledgements</name>

<t>Thanks to ...</t>

</section>


  </back>

</rfc>

