]> Ericsson AB

john.mattsson@ericsson.com

Ericsson AB

francesca.palombini@ericsson.com

INRIA

malisa.vucinic@inria.fr

LWIG Working Group This document analyzes and compares the sizes of key exchange flights and the per-packet message size overheads when using different security protocols to secure CoAP. Small message sizes are very important for reducing energy consumption, latency, and time to completion in constrained radio network such as Low-Power Wide Area Networks (LPWANs). The analyzed security protocols are DTLS 1.2, DTLS 1.3, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3, cTLS, EDHOC, OSCORE, and Group OSCORE. The DTLS and TLS record layers are analyzed with and without 6LoWPAN-GHC compression. DTLS is analyzed with and without Connection ID.

Introduction Small message sizes are very important for reducing energy consumption, latency, and time to completion in constrained radio network such as Low-Power Personal Area Networks (LPPANs) and Low-Power Wide Area Networks (LPWANs). Constrained radio networks are not only characterized by very small frame sizes on the order of tens of bytes transmitted a few times per day at ultra-low speeds, but also high latency, and severe duty cycles constraints. Some constrained radio networks are also multi-hop where the already small frame sizes are additionally reduced for each additional hop. Too large payload sizes can easily lead to unacceptable completion times due to fragmentation into a large number of frames and long waiting times between frames can be sent (or resent in the case of transmission errors). In constrained radio networks, the processing energy costs are typically almost negligible compared to the energy costs for radio and the energy costs for sensor measurement. Keeping the number of bytes or frames low is also essential for low latency and time to completion as well as efficient use of spectrum to support a large number of devices. For an overview of LPWANs and their limitations, see . To reduce overhead, processing, and energy consumption in constrained radio networks, IETF has created several working groups and technologies for constrained networks, e.g., (here technologies in parenthesis when the name is different from the working group): 6lo, 6LoWPAN, 6TiSCH, ACE, CBOR, CoRE (CoAP, OSCORE), COSE, LAKE (EDHOC), LPWAN (SCHC), ROLL (RPL), and TLS (cTLS). Compact formats and protocol have also been suggested as a way to decrease the energy consumption of Internet Applications and Systems in general . This document analyzes and compares the sizes of key exchange flights and the per-packet message size overheads when using different security protocols to secure CoAP over UPD and TCP . The analyzed security protocols are DTLS 1.2 , DTLS 1.3 , TLS 1.2 , TLS 1.3 , cTLS , EDHOC , OSCORE , and Group OSCORE . The DTLS and TLS record layers are analyzed with and without 6LoWPAN-GHC compression. DTLS is analyzed with and without Connection ID . Readers are expected to be familiar with some of the terms described in RFC 7925 , such as ICV. compares the overhead of key exchange, while covers the overhead for protection of application data. Readers of this document also might be interested in the following documents: , , , and gives an explanation of every byte in example TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3, DTLS 1.3, and EDHOC instances. looks at potential tools available for overcoming the deployment challenges induced by large certificates and long certificate chains and discusses solutions available to overcome these challenges. gives examples of IoT and Web certificates as well as examples on how effective C509 an TLS certificate compression is at compressing example certificate and certificate chains.

Overhead of Key Exchange Protocols This section analyzes and compares the sizes of key exchange flights for different protocols. To enable a fair comparison between protocols, the following assumptions are made:

• All the overhead calculations in this section use AES-CCM with a tag length of 8 bytes (e.g., AES_128_CCM_8 or AES-CCM-16-64-128).
• A minimum number of algorithms and cipher suites is offered. The algorithm used/offered are Curve25519 or P-256, ECDSA with P-256, AES-CCM_8, and SHA-256.
• The length of key identifiers are 1 byte.
• The length of connection identifiers are 1 byte.
• DTLS handshake message fragmentation is not considered.
• Several DTLS handshake messages are sent in a single record.
• Only mandatory (D)TLS extensions are included.

gives a short summary of the message overhead based on different parameters and some assumptions. The following sections detail the assumptions and the calculations.

Summary The DTLS overhead is dependent on the parameter Connection ID. The following overheads apply for all Connection IDs of the same length, when Connection ID is used. The EDHOC overhead is dependent on the key identifiers included. The following overheads apply for Sender IDs of the same length. All the overhead are dependent on the tag length. The following overheads apply for tags of the same length. compares the message sizes of DTLS 1.3 and EDHOC handshakes with connection ID. EDHOC is typically sent over CoAP which would add 4 bytes to flight #1 and #2 and 5 bytes to flight #3 (4 byte CoAP header and 1 byte Connection ID).

Comparison of message sizes in bytes with Connection ID

compares of message sizes of DTLS 1.3 and TLS 1.3 handshakes without connection ID.

Comparison of message sizes in bytes without Connection ID

The cTLS example in Figure 2. is taken from . The details of the other message size calculations are given in the following sections.

DTLS 1.3 This section gives an estimate of the message sizes of DTLS 1.3 with different authentication methods. Note that the examples in this section are not test vectors, the cryptographic parts are just replaced with byte strings of the same length, while other fixed length fields are replace with arbitrary strings or omitted, in which case their length is indicated. Values that are not arbitrary are given in hexadecimal.

Message Sizes RPK + ECDHE In this section, a Connection ID of 1 byte is used.

Flight #1 DTLS 1.3 RPK + ECDHE flight #1 gives 152 bytes of overhead.

Flight #2 DTLS 1.3 RPK + ECDHE flight #2 gives 414 bytes of overhead. With a point compressed RPK the overhead is 414 - 32 = 382 bytes, see .

Flight #3 DTLS 1.3 RPK + ECDHE flight #3 gives 248 bytes of overhead. With a point compressed RPK the overhead is 248 - 32 = 216 bytes, see .

Message Sizes PSK + ECDHE

Flight #1 The differences in overhead compared to are: The following is added: The following is removed: In total: DTLS 1.3 PSK + ECDHE flight #1 gives 186 bytes of overhead.

Flight #2 The differences in overhead compared to are: The following is added: The following is removed: In total: DTLS 1.3 PSK + ECDHE flight #2 gives 193 bytes of overhead.

Flight #3 The differences in overhead compared to are: The following is removed: In total: DTLS 1.3 PSK + ECDHE flight #3 gives 56 bytes of overhead.

Message Sizes PSK

Flight #1 The differences in overhead compared to are: The following is removed: In total: DTLS 1.3 PSK flight #1 gives 136 bytes of overhead.

Flight #2 The differences in overhead compared to are: The following is removed: In total: DTLS 1.3 PSK flight #2 gives 153 bytes of overhead.

Flight #3 There are no differences in overhead compared to . DTLS 1.3 PSK flight #3 gives 56 bytes of overhead.

Cached Information In this section, we consider the effect of on the message size overhead. Cached information can be used to use a cached server cerificate from a previous connection and move bytes from flight #2 to flight #1. The cached certificate can be a RPK or X.509. The differences compared to are the following.

Flight #1 For the flight #1, the following is added: Giving a total of: In the case the cached certificate is X.509 the following is removed: Giving a total of:

Flight #2 For the flight #2, the following is added: And the following is reduced: 32 bytes) ]]> Giving a total of: In the case the cached certificate is X.509 the following is removed: Giving a total of:

Resumption To enable resumption, a 4th flight with a the handshake message New Session Ticket is added to the DTLS handshake. Enabling resumption adds 41 bytes to the initial DTLS handshake. The resumption handshake is an ordinaty PSK handshake with our without ECDHE.

DTLS Without Connection ID Without a Connection ID the DTLS 1.3 flight sizes changes as follows.

Raw Public Keys This sections illustrates the format of P-256 (secp256r1) SubjectPublicKeyInfo with and without point compression. Point compression in SubjectPublicKeyInfo is standardized in and is therefore theoretically possible to use in PRKs and X.509 certificates used in (D)TLS but does not seems to be supported by (D)TLS implementations.

SubjectPublicKeyInfo Without Point Compression

SubjectPublicKeyInfo With Point Compression

TLS 1.3 In this section, the message sizes are calculated for TLS 1.3. The major changes compared to DTLS 1.3 are a different record header, the handshake headers is smaller, and that Connection ID is not supported. Recently, additional work has taken shape with the goal to further reduce overhead for TLS 1.3 (see ).

Message Sizes RPK + ECDHE

Flight #1 TLS 1.3 RPK + ECDHE flight #1 gives 129 bytes of overhead.

Flight #2 TLS 1.3 RPK + ECDHE flight #2 gives 354 bytes of overhead.

Flight #3 TLS 1.3 RPK + ECDHE flight #3 gives 226 bytes of overhead.

Message Sizes PSK + ECDHE

Flight #1 The differences in overhead compared to are: The following is added: The following is removed: In total: TLS 1.3 PSK + ECDHE flight #1 gives 163 bytes of overhead.

Flight #2 The differences in overhead compared to are: The following is added: The following is removed: In total: TLS 1.3 PSK + ECDHE flight #2 gives 157 bytes of overhead.

Flight #3 The differences in overhead compared to are: The following is removed: In total: TLS 1.3 PSK + ECDHE flight #3 gives 50 bytes of overhead.

Message Sizes PSK

Flight #1 The differences in overhead compared to are: The following is removed: In total: TLS 1.3 PSK flight #1 gives 113 bytes of overhead.

Flight #2 The differences in overhead compared to are: The following is removed: In total: TLS 1.3 PSK flight #2 gives 117 bytes of overhead.

Flight #3 There are no differences in overhead compared to . TLS 1.3 PSK flight #3 gives 50 bytes of overhead.

TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 The TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 handshakes are not analyzed in detail in this document. One rough comparison on expected size between the TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 handshakes can be found by counting the number of bytes in the example handshakes of and . In these examples the server authenticates with a certificate and the client is not authenticated. In TLS 1.2 the number of bytes in the four flights are 170, 1188, 117, and 75 for a total of 1550 bytes. In TLS 1.3 the number of bytes in the three flights are 253, 1367, and 79 for a total of 1699 bytes. In general, the (D)TLS 1.2 and (D)TLS 1.3 handshakes can be expected to have similar number of bytes.

EDHOC This section gives an estimate of the message sizes of EDHOC authenticated with static Diffie-Hellman keys and where the static Diffie-Hellman are identified with a key identifier (kid). All examples are given in CBOR diagnostic notation and hexadecimal, and are based on the test vectors in Section 4 of .

Message Sizes RPK

message_1

message_2

message_3

Summary Based on the example above it is relatively easy to calculate numbers also for EDHOC authenticated with signature keys and for authentication keys identified with a SHA-256/64 hash (x5t). Signatures increase the size of flight #2 and #3 with (64 - 8 + 1) bytes while x5t inceases the size with 13-14 bytes. The typical message sizes for the previous example and for the other combinations are summarized in . Note that EDHOC treats authentication keys stored in RPK and X.509 in the same way. More detailed examples can be found in .

Typical message sizes in bytes

Conclusion To do a fair comparison, one has to choose a specific deployment and look at the topology, the whole protocol stack, frame sizes (e.g., 51 or 128 bytes), how and where in the protocol stack fragmentation is done, and the expected packet loss. Note that the number of bytes in each frame that is available for the key exchange protocol may depend on the underlying protocol layers as well as on the number of hops in multi-hop networks. The packet loss may depend on how many other devices are transmitting at the same time, and may increase during network formation. The total overhead will be larger due to mechanisms for fragmentation, retransmission, and packet ordering. The overhead of fragmentation is roughly proportional to the number of fragments, while the expected overhead due to retransmission in noisy environments is a superlinear function of the flight sizes.

Overhead for Protection of Application Data To enable comparison, all the overhead calculations in this section use AES-CCM with a tag length of 8 bytes (e.g., AES_128_CCM_8 or AES-CCM-16-64), a plaintext of 6 bytes, and the sequence number '05'. This follows the example in , Figure 16. Note that the compressed overhead calculations for DLTS 1.2, DTLS 1.3, TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 are dependent on the parameters epoch, sequence number, and length (where applicable), and all the overhead calculations are dependent on the parameter Connection ID when used. Note that the OSCORE overhead calculations are dependent on the CoAP option numbers, as well as the length of the OSCORE parameters Sender ID, ID Context, and Sequence Number (where applicable). cTLS uses the DTLS 1.3 record layer. The following calculations are only examples. gives a short summary of the message overhead based on different parameters and some assumptions. The following sections detail the assumptions and the calculations.

Summary The DTLS overhead is dependent on the parameter Connection ID. The following overheads apply for all Connection IDs with the same length. The compression overhead (GHC) is dependent on the parameters epoch, sequence number, Connection ID, and length (where applicable). The following overheads should be representative for sequence numbers and Connection IDs with the same length. The OSCORE overhead is dependent on the included CoAP Option numbers as well as the length of the OSCORE parameters Sender ID and sequence number. The following overheads apply for all sequence numbers and Sender IDs with the same length.

Overhead in bytes as a function of sequence number       (Connection/Sender ID = '')

Overhead in bytes as a function of Connection/Sender ID       (Sequence Number = '05')

Overhead (excluding ICV) in bytes                   (Connection/Sender ID = '', Sequence Number = '05')

The numbers in , , and } does not consider the different Token processing requirements for clients required for secure operation as motivated by . As reuse of Tokens is easier in OSCORE than DTLS, OSCORE might have slightly lower overhead than DTLS 1.3 for long connection even if DTLS 1.3 has slightly lower overhead than OSCORE for short connections.

DTLS 1.2

DTLS 1.2 This section analyzes the overhead of DTLS 1.2 . The nonce follow the strict profiling given in . This example is taken directly from , Figure 16. DTLS 1.2 gives 29 bytes overhead.

DTLS 1.2 with 6LoWPAN-GHC This section analyzes the overhead of DTLS 1.2 when compressed with 6LoWPAN-GHC . The compression was done with . Note that the sequence number '01' used in , Figure 15 gives an exceptionally small overhead that is not representative. Note that this header compression is not available when DTLS is used over transports that do not use 6LoWPAN together with 6LoWPAN-GHC. When compressed with 6LoWPAN-GHC, DTLS 1.2 with the above parameters (epoch, sequence number, length) gives 16 bytes overhead.

DTLS 1.2 with Connection ID This section analyzes the overhead of DTLS 1.2 with Connection ID . The overhead calculations in this section uses Connection ID = '42'. DTLS recored layer with a Connection ID = '' (the empty string) is equal to DTLS without Connection ID. DTLS 1.2 with Connection ID gives 30 bytes overhead.

DTLS 1.2 with Connection ID and 6LoWPAN-GHC This section analyzes the overhead of DTLS 1.2 with Connection ID when compressed with 6LoWPAN-GHC . Note that the sequence number '01' used in , Figure 15 gives an exceptionally small overhead that is not representative. Note that this header compression is not available when DTLS is used over transports that do not use 6LoWPAN together with 6LoWPAN-GHC. When compressed with 6LoWPAN-GHC, DTLS 1.2 with the above parameters (epoch, sequence number, Connection ID, length) gives 17 bytes overhead.

DTLS 1.3

DTLS 1.3 This section analyzes the overhead of DTLS 1.3 . The changes compared to DTLS 1.2 are: omission of version number, merging of epoch into the first byte containing signaling bits, optional omission of length, reduction of sequence number into a 1 or 2-bytes field. DTLS 1.3 is only analyzed with an omitted length field and with an 8-bit sequence number (see Figure 4 of ). DTLS 1.3 gives 11 bytes overhead.

DTLS 1.3 with 6LoWPAN-GHC This section analyzes the overhead of DTLS 1.3 when compressed with 6LoWPAN-GHC . Note that this header compression is not available when DTLS is used over transports that do not use 6LoWPAN together with 6LoWPAN-GHC. When compressed with 6LoWPAN-GHC, DTLS 1.3 with the above parameters (epoch, sequence number, no length) gives 12 bytes overhead.

DTLS 1.3 with Connection ID This section analyzes the overhead of DTLS 1.3 with Connection ID . In this example, the length field is omitted, and the 1-byte field is used for the sequence number. The minimal DTLSCiphertext structure is used (see Figure 4 of ), with the addition of the Connection ID field. DTLS 1.3 with Connection ID gives 12 bytes overhead.

DTLS 1.3 with Connection ID and 6LoWPAN-GHC This section analyzes the overhead of DTLS 1.3 with Connection ID when compressed with 6LoWPAN-GHC . Note that this header compression is not available when DTLS is used over transports that do not use 6LoWPAN together with 6LoWPAN-GHC. When compressed with 6LoWPAN-GHC, DTLS 1.3 with the above parameters (epoch, sequence number, Connection ID, no length) gives 13 bytes overhead.

TLS 1.2

TLS 1.2 This section analyzes the overhead of TLS 1.2 . The changes compared to DTLS 1.2 is that the TLS 1.2 record layer does not have epoch and sequence number, and that the version is different. TLS 1.2 gives 21 bytes overhead.

TLS 1.2 with 6LoWPAN-GHC This section analyzes the overhead of TLS 1.2 when compressed with 6LoWPAN-GHC . Note that this header compression is not available when TLS is used over transports that do not use 6LoWPAN together with 6LoWPAN-GHC. When compressed with 6LoWPAN-GHC, TLS 1.2 with the above parameters (epoch, sequence number, length) gives 17 bytes overhead.

TLS 1.3

TLS 1.3 This section analyzes the overhead of TLS 1.3 . The change compared to TLS 1.2 is that the TLS 1.3 record layer uses a different version. TLS 1.3 gives 14 bytes overhead.

TLS 1.3 with 6LoWPAN-GHC This section analyzes the overhead of TLS 1.3 when compressed with 6LoWPAN-GHC . Note that this header compression is not available when TLS is used over transports that do not use 6LoWPAN together with 6LoWPAN-GHC. When compressed with 6LoWPAN-GHC, TLS 1.3 with the above parameters (epoch, sequence number, length) gives 15 bytes overhead.

OSCORE This section analyzes the overhead of OSCORE . The below calculation Option Delta = '9', Sender ID = '' (empty string), and Sequence Number = '05', and is only an example. Note that Sender ID = '' (empty string) can only be used by one client per server. The below calculation Option Delta = '9', Sender ID = '42', and Sequence Number = '05', and is only an example. The below calculation uses Option Delta = '9'. OSCORE with the above parameters gives 13-14 bytes overhead for requests and 11 bytes overhead for responses. Unlike DTLS and TLS, OSCORE has much smaller overhead for responses than requests.

Group OSCORE This section analyzes the overhead of Group OSCORE . Group OSCORE defines a pairwise mode where each member of the group can efficiently derive a symmetric pairwise key with any other member of the group for pairwise OSCORE communication. Additional requirements compared to is that ID Context is always included in requests and that Sender ID is always included in responses. Assuming 1 byte ID Context and Sender ID this adds 2 bytes to requests and 1 byte to responses. The below calculation Option Delta = '9', ID Context = '', Sender ID = '42', and Sequence Number = '05', and is only an example. ID Context = '' would be the standard for local deployments only having a single group. The below calculation uses Option Delta = '9' and Sender ID = '69', and is only an example. The pairwise mode OSCORE with the above parameters gives 15 bytes overhead for requests and 12 bytes overhead for responses.

Conclusion DTLS 1.2 has quite a large overhead as it uses an explicit sequence number and an explicit nonce. TLS 1.2 has significantly less (but not small) overhead. TLS 1.3 has quite a small overhead. OSCORE and DTLS 1.3 (using the minimal structure) format have very small overhead. The Generic Header Compression (6LoWPAN-GHC) can in addition to DTLS 1.2 handle TLS 1.2, and DTLS 1.2 with Connection ID. The Generic Header Compression (6LoWPAN-GHC) works very well for Connection ID and the overhead seems to increase exactly with the length of the Connection ID (which is optimal). The compression of TLS 1.2 is not as good as the compression of DTLS 1.2 (as the static dictionary only contains the DTLS 1.2 version number). Similar compression levels as for DTLS could be achieved also for TLS 1.2, but this would require different static dictionaries. For TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3, GHC increases the overhead. The 6LoWPAN-GHC header compression is not available when (D)TLS is used over transports that do not use 6LoWPAN together with 6LoWPAN-GHC. New security protocols like OSCORE, TLS 1.3, and DTLS 1.3 have much lower overhead than DTLS 1.2 and TLS 1.2. The overhead is even smaller than DTLS 1.2 and TLS 1.2 over 6LoWPAN with compression, and therefore the small overhead is achieved even on deployments without 6LoWPAN or 6LoWPAN without compression. OSCORE is lightweight because it makes use of CoAP, CBOR, and COSE, which were designed to have as low overhead as possible. As can be seen in , Group OSCORE for pairwise communication increases the overhead of OSCORE requests with 20% and OSCORE responses with 33%. Note that the compared protocols have slightly different use cases. TLS and DTLS are designed for the transport layer and are terminated in CoAP proxies. OSCORE is designed for the application layer and protects information end-to-end between the CoAP client and the CoAP server. Group OSCORE is designed for communication in a group.

Security Considerations This document is purely informational.

IANA Considerations This document has no actions for IANA.

Informative References This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document specifies the syntax and semantics for the Subject Public Key Information field in certificates that support Elliptic Curve Cryptography. This document updates Sections 2.3.5 and 5, and the ASN.1 module of "Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document specifies version 1.2 of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. The DTLS protocol provides communications privacy for datagram protocols. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. The DTLS protocol is based on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees. Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are preserved by the DTLS protocol. This document updates DTLS 1.0 to work with TLS version 1.2. [STANDARDS-TRACK] RFC 6282 defines header compression in 6LoWPAN packets (where "6LoWPAN" refers to "IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Network"). The present document specifies a simple addition that enables the compression of generic headers and header-like payloads, without a need to define a new header compression scheme for each such new header or header-like payload. The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) is a specialized web transfer protocol for use with constrained nodes and constrained (e.g., low-power, lossy) networks. The nodes often have 8-bit microcontrollers with small amounts of ROM and RAM, while constrained networks such as IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs) often have high packet error rates and a typical throughput of 10s of kbit/s. The protocol is designed for machine- to-machine (M2M) applications such as smart energy and building automation. CoAP provides a request/response interaction model between application endpoints, supports built-in discovery of services and resources, and includes key concepts of the Web such as URIs and Internet media types. CoAP is designed to easily interface with HTTP for integration with the Web while meeting specialized requirements such as multicast support, very low overhead, and simplicity for constrained environments. Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshakes often include fairly static information, such as the server certificate and a list of trusted certification authorities (CAs). This information can be of considerable size, particularly if the server certificate is bundled with a complete certificate chain (i.e., the certificates of intermediate CAs up to the root CA). This document defines an extension that allows a TLS client to inform a server of cached information, thereby enabling the server to omit already available information. A common design pattern in Internet of Things (IoT) deployments is the use of a constrained device that collects data via sensors or controls actuators for use in home automation, industrial control systems, smart cities, and other IoT deployments. This document defines a Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) 1.2 profile that offers communications security for this data exchange thereby preventing eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. The lack of communication security is a common vulnerability in IoT products that can easily be solved by using these well-researched and widely deployed Internet security protocols. The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), although inspired by HTTP, was designed to use UDP instead of TCP. The message layer of CoAP over UDP includes support for reliable delivery, simple congestion control, and flow control. Some environments benefit from the availability of CoAP carried over reliable transports such as TCP or Transport Layer Security (TLS). This document outlines the changes required to use CoAP over TCP, TLS, and WebSockets transports. It also formally updates RFC 7641 for use with these transports and RFC 7959 to enable the use of larger messages over a reliable transport. Low-Power Wide Area Networks (LPWANs) are wireless technologies with characteristics such as large coverage areas, low bandwidth, possibly very small packet and application-layer data sizes, and long battery life operation. This memo is an informational overview of the set of LPWAN technologies being considered in the IETF and of the gaps that exist between the needs of those technologies and the goal of running IP in LPWANs. This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations. This document defines Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE), a method for application-layer protection of the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), using CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE). OSCORE provides end-to-end protection between endpoints communicating using CoAP or CoAP-mappable HTTP. OSCORE is designed for constrained nodes and networks supporting a range of proxy operations, including translation between different transport protocols. Although an optional functionality of CoAP, OSCORE alters CoAP options processing and IANA registration. Therefore, this document updates RFC 7252. In TLS handshakes, certificate chains often take up the majority of the bytes transmitted. This document describes how certificate chains can be compressed to reduce the amount of data transmitted and avoid some round trips. This document specifies the Connection ID (CID) construct for the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol version 1.2. A CID is an identifier carried in the record layer header that gives the recipient additional information for selecting the appropriate security association. In "classical" DTLS, selecting a security association of an incoming DTLS record is accomplished with the help of the 5-tuple. If the source IP address and/or source port changes during the lifetime of an ongoing DTLS session, then the receiver will be unable to locate the correct security context. The new ciphertext record format with the CID also provides content type encryption and record layer padding. This document updates RFC 6347. This document specifies version 1.3 of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. DTLS 1.3 allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. The DTLS 1.3 protocol is based on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees with the exception of order protection / non-replayability. Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are preserved by the DTLS protocol. This document obsoletes RFC 6347. This document specifies enhancements to the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) that mitigate security issues in particular use cases. The Echo option enables a CoAP server to verify the freshness of a request or to force a client to demonstrate reachability at its claimed network address. The Request-Tag option allows the CoAP server to match block-wise message fragments belonging to the same request. This document updates RFC 7252 with respect to the following: processing requirements for client Tokens, forbidding non-secure reuse of Tokens to ensure response-to-request binding when CoAP is used with a security protocol, and amplification mitigation (where the use of the Echo option is now recommended). The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in RFC 3748, provides a standard mechanism for support of multiple authentication methods. EAP-TLS and other TLS-based EAP methods are widely deployed and used for network access authentication. Large certificates and long certificate chains combined with authenticators that drop an EAP session after only 40 - 50 round trips is a major deployment problem. This document looks at this problem in detail and describes the potential solutions available. Being able to securely read information from sensors, to securely control actuators, and to not enable distributed denial-of-service attacks are essential in a world of connected and networking things interacting with the physical world. Using a security protocol such as DTLS, TLS, or OSCORE to protect CoAP is a requirement for secure operation and protects against many attacks. This document summarizes a number of known attacks on CoAP deployments and show that just using CoAP with a security protocol like DTLS, TLS, or OSCORE is not enough for secure operation. Several of the discussed attacks can be mitigated with the solutions in RFC 9175. Ericsson RISE AB RISE AB Fraunhofer AISEC Ericsson The lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol EDHOC can be run over CoAP and used by two peers to establish an OSCORE Security Context. This document further profiles this use of the EDHOC protocol, by specifying a number of additional and optional mechanisms. These especially include an optimization approach for combining the execution of EDHOC with the first subsequent OSCORE transaction. This combination reduces the number of round trips required to set up an OSCORE Security Context and to complete an OSCORE transaction using that Security Context. RISE AB Ericsson AB Ericsson AB Ericsson AB Universitaet Duisburg-Essen This document defines Group Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (Group OSCORE), providing end-to-end security of CoAP messages exchanged between members of a group, e.g., sent over IP multicast. In particular, the described approach defines how OSCORE is used in a group communication setting to provide source authentication for CoAP group requests, sent by a client to multiple servers, and for protection of the corresponding CoAP responses. Group OSCORE also defines a pairwise mode where each member of the group can efficiently derive a symmetric pairwise key with any other member of the group for pairwise OSCORE communication. Ericsson AB Ericsson AB RISE AB RISE AB Nexus Group This document specifies a CBOR encoding of X.509 certificates. The resulting certificates are called C509 Certificates. The CBOR encoding supports a large subset of RFC 5280 and all certificates compatible with the RFC 7925, IEEE 802.1AR (DevID), CNSA, RPKI, GSMA eUICC, and CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements profiles. When used to re-encode DER encoded X.509 certificates, the CBOR encoding can in many cases reduce the size of RFC 7925 profiled certificates with over 50%. The CBOR encoded structure can alternatively be signed directly ("natively signed"), which does not require re- encoding for the signature to be verified. The document also specifies C509 COSE headers, a C509 TLS certificate type, and a C509 file format. Ericsson AB Ericsson AB Ericsson AB This document specifies Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC), a very compact and lightweight authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange with ephemeral keys. EDHOC provides mutual authentication, forward secrecy, and identity protection. EDHOC is intended for usage in constrained scenarios and a main use case is to establish an OSCORE security context. By reusing COSE for cryptography, CBOR for encoding, and CoAP for transport, the additional code size can be kept very low. Ericsson Ericsson ASSA ABLOY RISE This document contains some example traces of Ephemeral Diffie- Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC). Mozilla Cisco Arm Limited Google This document specifies a "compact" version of TLS and DTLS. It is logically isomorphic to ordinary TLS, but saves space by trimming obsolete material, tighter encoding, a template-based specialization technique, and alternative cryptographic techniques. cTLS is not directly interoperable with TLS or DTLS, but it should eventually be possible for a single server port to offer cTLS alongside TLS or DTLS. n.d. n.d. n.d.

Acknowledgments The authors want to thank , , , , and for comments and suggestions on previous versions of the draft. All 6LoWPAN-GHC compression was done with . as a was a useful resource for the TLS handshake content and formatting and was a useful resource for SubjectPublicKeyInfo formatting.