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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-drip-registries-20" category="std" consensus="true" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" version="3">
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="DET in DNS">DRIP Entity Tags (DET) in the Domain Name System (DNS)</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-drip-registries-20"/>
    <author initials="A." surname="Wiethuechter" fullname="Adam Wiethuechter" role="editor">
      <organization>AX Enterprize, LLC</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>4947 Commercial Drive</street>
          <city>Yorkville</city>
          <region>NY</region>
          <code>13495</code>
          <country>USA</country>
        </postal>
        <email>adam.wiethuechter@axenterprize.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="J." surname="Reid" fullname="Jim Reid">
      <organization>RTFM llp</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>St Andrews House</street>
          <city>382 Hillington Road, Glasgow Scotland</city>
          <code>G51 4BL</code>
          <country>UK</country>
        </postal>
        <email>jim@rfc1035.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2024" month="November" day="15"/>
    <area>Internet</area>
    <workgroup>drip Working Group</workgroup>
    <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <?line 87?>

<t>This document describes the discovery and management of DRIP Entity Tags (DETs) in DNS. Authoritative Name Servers, with DRIP specific DNS structures and standard DNS methods, are the Public Information Registries for DETs and their related metadata.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <?line 91?>

<section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Registries are fundamental to Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Remote Identification (RID). Only very limited operational information can be sent via Broadcast RID, but extended information is sometimes needed. The most essential element of information from RID is the UAS ID, the unique key for lookup of extended information in relevant registries (see Figure 4 of <xref target="RFC9434"/>).</t>
      <t>When a DRIP Entity Tag (DET) <xref target="RFC9374"/> is used as the UAS ID in RID, extended information can be retrieved from a DRIP Identity Management Entity (DIME) which manages registration of and associated lookups from DETs. In this document we assume the DIME is a function of UAS Service Suppliers (USS) (Appendix A.2 of <xref target="RFC9434"/>) but a DIME can be independent or handled by another entity as well.</t>
      <section anchor="general-concept">
        <name>General Concept</name>
        <t>DRIP Entity Tags (DETs) embedded a hierarchy scheme which is mapped onto the Domain Name System (DNS). DIME's enforce registration and information access of data associated with a DET while also providing the trust inherited from being a member of the hierarchy. Other identifiers and their methods are out of scope for this document.</t>
        <t>Authoritative Name Servers of the Domain Name System (DNS) provide the Public Information such as the cryptographic keys, endorsements and certificates of DETs and pointers to Private Information resources. Cryptographic (public) keys are used to authenticate anything signed by a DET, such as in the Authentication defined <xref target="RFC9575"/> for Broadcast RID. Endorsements and certificates are used to endorse the claim of being part of the hierarchy.</t>
        <t>Aspects of Private Information Registries to store and protect, through AAA mechanisms, Personally Identifiable Information (PII) are not described in this document.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="use-of-existing-dns-models">
        <name>Use of Existing DNS Models</name>
        <t>DRIP relies on the DNS and as such roughly follows the registrant-registrar-registry model. In DRIP, the registrant would be the end user who owns/controls the Unmanned Aircraft. They are ultimately responsible for the DET and any other information that gets published in the DNS. Registrants use agents known as registrars to manage their interactions with the registry. Registrars typically provide optional additional services such as DNS hosting.</t>
        <t>The registry maintains a database of the registered domain names and their related metadata such as the contact details for domain name holder and the relevant registrar. The registry provides DNS service for the zone apex which contains delegation information for domain names. Registries generally provide services such as WHOIS or RDAP to publish metadata about the registered domain names and their registrants and registrars.</t>
        <t>Registrants have contracts with registrars who in turn have contracts with registries. Payments follow this model too: the registrant buys services from a registrar who pays for services provided by the registry.</t>
        <t>By definition, there can only be one registry for a domain name. Since that registry is a de facto monopoly, the scope of its activities are usually kept to a minimum to reduce the potential for market distortions or anti-competitive practices. A registry can have an arbitrary number of registrars who compete with each other on price, service and customer support.</t>
        <t>It is not necessary, and in some case may not be desirable, for DRIP registrations to strictly follow this registrant-registrar-registry model. Prevailing circumstances and/or local policy may mean some combination of these roles could be combined. A DRIP registry might be operated by the CAA. Or it could be outsourced to a DNS registry provider. Registration policies - pricing, renewals, registrar and registrant agreements, etc. - will need to be developed. These considerations SHOULD be determined by the CAA, perhaps in consultation with local stakeholders. They are are out of scope for this document.</t>
        <t>The specifics for the UAS RID use case are detailed in the rest of document.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="scope">
        <name>Scope</name>
        <t>The scope of this document is limited to the <tt>2001:30::/28</tt> IPv6 prefix and its associated reverse domain in DNS for DETs being used in UAS RID for participating parties (UA, Observer devices, DIMEs, etc.).</t>
        <t>Other sectors may adopt this technology. It is RECOMMENDED that a global Apex (i.e. IPv6 prefix) and international Apex manager be designated for each sector.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="terminology">
      <name>Terminology</name>
      <section anchor="required-terminology">
        <name>Required Terminology</name>
        <t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="additional-definitions">
        <name>Additional Definitions</name>
        <t>This document makes use of the terms (PII, USS, etc.) defined in <xref target="RFC9153"/>. Other terms (DIME, Endorsement, etc.) are from <xref target="RFC9434"/>, while others (RAA, HDA, etc.) are from <xref target="RFC9374"/>.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="det-hierarchy-in-dns">
      <name>DET Hierarchy in DNS</name>
      <t><xref target="RFC9374"/> defines the Hierarchical Host Identity Tag (HHIT) and further specifies an instance of them used for UAS RID called DETs. The HHIT is a 128-bit value that is as an IPv6 address intended primarily as an identifier rather than locator. It's format is in <xref target="hhit-fig"/> and further information is in <xref target="RFC9374"/>.</t>
      <figure anchor="hhit-fig">
        <name>DRIP Entity Tag Breakdown</name>
        <artwork align="center"><![CDATA[
+-------------+--------------+---------------+-------------+
| IPv6 Prefix | Hierarchy ID | HHIT Suite ID | ORCHID Hash |
| (28-bits)   | (28-bits)    | (8-bits)      | (64-bits)   |
+-------------+--------------+---------------+-------------+
             /                \
            /                  \
           /                    \-----------------------------\
          /                                                    \
         /                                                      \
        +--------------------------------+-----------------------+
        | Registered Assigning Authority | HHIT Domain Authority |
        | (14-bits)                      | (14-bits)             |
        +--------------------------------+-----------------------+
]]></artwork>
      </figure>
      <t>The IPv6 Prefix, assigned by IANA for DETs is <tt>2001:30::/28</tt>. The corresponding domain (nibble reversed as <tt>3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa</tt>) is owned by the IAB.</t>
      <t>Due to the nature of the hierarchy split and its relationship to nibble reversing of the IPv6 address, the upper level of hierarchy (i.e. RAAs) "borrows" the upper two bits of their respective HDA space for DNS delegation. As such the IPv6 prefix of RAAs are <tt>2001:3x:xxx::/44</tt> and HDAs are <tt>2001:3x:xxxx:xx::/56</tt> with respective nibble reverse domains of <tt>x.x.x.x.3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa</tt> and <tt>y.y.y.x.x.x.x.3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa</tt>.</t>
      <t>Preallocations have been made based on the ISO 3166-1 Numeric Nation Code <xref target="ISO3166-1"/>. This is to support the initial use case of DETs in UAS RID on an international level. See <xref target="iana-raa"/> for the RAA allocations.</t>
      <t>The HDA values of 0, 4096, 8192 and 12288 are reserved for operational use of an RAA (a by-product of the above mentioned borrowing of bits), specifically when to register with the Apex and endorse delegations of HDAs in their namespace.</t>
      <t>The administration, management and policy for operation a DIME at any level in the hierarchy (Apex, RAA or HDA), be it external or from a parent level, is out of scope for this document. In some cases, such as the RAAs and HDAs of a nation, these are National Matters which are to be dealt with by those parties accordingly.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="dns">
      <name>Public Information Registry</name>
      <t>Per <xref target="RFC9434"/> all information classified, by all parties involved, as public is stored in the DNS, specifically Authoritative Name Servers, to satisfy REG-1 from <xref target="RFC9153"/>.</t>
      <t>Authoritative Name Servers use domain names as handles and data is stored in Resource Records (RR) with associated RRTypes. This document defines two new RRTypes, one for HHIT metadata (HHIT, <xref target="hhit-rr"/>) and another for UAS Broadcast RID information (BRID, <xref target="bcast-rr"/>). The former RRType is particularly important as it contains a URI (as part of the certificate) that point to Private Information resources.</t>
      <t>DETs, being IPv6 addresses, are to be under <tt>ip6.arpa</tt> (nibble reversed per convention) with at minimum an HHIT RRType. Depending on local circumstances or additional use cases other RRTypes MAY be present. For UAS RID the BRID RRType MUST be present to provide the Broadcast Endorsements defined in <xref target="RFC9575"/>.</t>
      <t>DNSSEC is strongly RECOMMENDED (especially for RAA-level and higher zones). When a DIME decides to use DNSSEC they SHOULD define a framework for cryptographic algorithms and key management <xref target="RFC6841"/>. This may be influenced by frequency of updates, size of the zone, and policies.</t>
      <t>UAS specific information, such as physical characteristics, MAY also be stored in DNS but is out of scope for this document. This specification information is currently drafted in <xref target="uas-sn-dns"/>.</t>
      <t>Lookups of the above RRTypes are performed with the standard DNS methodology using the nibble reversed DET as the query name affixed to the <tt>ip6.arpa</tt> domain apex and asking for the specific RRType. The HHIT RRType provides the public key for signature verification and URIs via the certificate. The BRID RRType provides static Broadcast RID information such as the Broadcast Endorsements sent following <xref target="RFC9575"/>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="resource-records">
      <name>Resource Records</name>
      <section anchor="hhit-rr">
        <name>HHIT Resource Record</name>
        <t>The HHIT Resource Record is a metadata record for various bits of HHIT specific information that isn't available in the pre-existing HIP RRType.</t>
        <figure anchor="hhit-wire">
          <name>HHIT Wire Format</name>
          <artwork align="center"><![CDATA[
                     1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                        HHIT Data Length                       |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                                                               |
.                                                               .
.                   HHIT Data (CBOR Encoded)                    .
.                                                               .
|                                                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <t>The HHIT Data Length is 32-bit integer representing the number of bytes contained in the HHIT Data field. The HHIT Data field MUST be encoded in CBOR bytes. The CDDL of the HHIT Data is provided in <xref target="hhit-wire-cddl"/>.</t>
        <section anchor="hhit-rr-text">
          <name>Text Representation</name>
          <t>The HHIT Data is represented in base64 and may be divided into any number of white-space-separated substrings, down to single base64 digits, which are concatenated to obtain the full object. These substrings can span lines using the standard parenthesis. Note that the HHIT Data portion has internal subfields, but these do not appear in the master file representation only a single logical base64 string will appear. The HHIT Data Length is not represented as it is implicitly known by the HHIT Data.</t>
          <section anchor="hhit-rr-presentation">
            <name>Presentation Representation</name>
            <t>The HHIT Data portion MAY, for display purposes only, be represented using the Extended Diagnostic Notation as defined in Appendix G of <xref target="RFC8610"/>.</t>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="hhit-rr-fields">
          <name>Field Descriptions</name>
          <figure anchor="hhit-wire-cddl">
            <name>HHIT Wire Format CDDL</name>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
hhit-rr = [
    type: uint .size(2), 
    abbreviation: tstr .size(15), 
    registration-cert: bstr / #6.TBD
]
]]></artwork>
          </figure>
          <dl>
            <dt>HHIT Entity Type:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>This field is two octets with values defined in <xref target="iana-hhit-type"/>. It is envisioned that there may be many types of HHITs in use. In some cases it may be helpful to understand the HHITs role in the ecosystem like described in <xref target="drip-dki"/>. This field provides such context.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>HID Abbreviation:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>This field is meant to provide an abbreviation to the HID structure for display devices. The specific contents of this field are not defined here.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>Canonical Registration Certificate:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>This field is reserved for any certificate to endorse registration that contains the DET. It is in either encoded as X.509 DER or C.509.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="bcast-rr">
        <name>UAS Broadcast RID Resource Record</name>
        <t>The UAS Broadcast RID Resource Record type (BRID) is a format to hold public information typically sent of the UAS Broadcast RID that is static. It can act as a data source if information is not received over Broadcast RID or for cross validation.</t>
        <figure anchor="bcast-wire">
          <name>BRID Wire Format</name>
          <artwork align="center"><![CDATA[
                     1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                        BRID Data Length                       |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                                                               |
.                                                               .
.                   BRID Data (CBOR Encoded)                    .
.                                                               .
|                                                               |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
]]></artwork>
        </figure>
        <t>The BRID Data Length is 32-bit integer representing the number of bytes contained in the BRID Data field. The BRID Data field MUST be encoded in CBOR bytes. The CDDL of the BRID Data is provided in <xref target="bcast-wire-cddl"/>.</t>
        <section anchor="bcast-rr-text">
          <name>Text Representation</name>
          <t>The BRID Data is represented in base64 and may be divided into any number of white-space-separated substrings, down to single base64 digits, which are concatenated to obtain the full object. These substrings can span lines using the standard parenthesis. Note that the BRID Data portion has internal subfields, but these do not appear in the master file representation only a single logical base64 string will appear. The BRID Data Length is not represented as it is implicitly known by the BRID Data.</t>
          <section anchor="bcast-rr-presentation">
            <name>Presentation Representation</name>
            <t>The BRID Data portion MAY, for display purposes only, be represented using the Extended Diagnostic Notation as defined in Appendix G of <xref target="RFC8610"/>. All byte strings longer than a length of 20 SHOULD be displayed as base64 when possible.</t>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="bcast-rr-fields">
          <name>Field Descriptions</name>
          <figure anchor="bcast-wire-cddl">
            <name>BRID Wire Format CDDL</name>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
bcast-rr = {
    uas_type: nibble-field,
    uas_ids: [+ uas-id-grp],
    ? auth: [+ auth-grp],
    ? self-grp,
    ? op_type: 0..3,
    ? area-grp,
    ? classification-grp,
    ? operator-grp
}
uas-id-grp = (
    id_type: &uas-id-types, 
    uas_id: bstr .size(20)
)
uas-id-types = (none: 0, serial: 1, caa_id: 2, utm_id: 3, session_id: 4)
auth-grp = (
    a_type: nibble-field,
    a_data: bstr .size(1..362)
)
area-grp = (
    area_count: 1..255,
    area_radius: float,
    area_floor: float,
    area_ceiling: float
)
classification-grp = (
    ua_class: 0..8,
    eu_class: nibble-field,
    eu_category: nibble-field
)
self-grp = (
    desc_type: nibble-field,
    description: tstr .size(23)
)
operator-grp = (
    operator_id_type: nibble-field,
    operator_id: bstr .size(20)
)
nibble-field = 0..15
]]></artwork>
          </figure>
          <t>The field names and their general typing are borrowed from the ASTM <xref target="F3411"/> data dictionary. See that document for additional information on fields semantics and units.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="drip-prefix-delegation">
        <name>DRIP Prefix Delegation</name>
        <t>This document requests that the IANA delegate the <tt>3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa</tt> domain. IANA will be responsible for processing requests under the guidance of the Designated Expert.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="iana-drip-registry">
        <name>IANA DRIP Registry</name>
        <section anchor="iana-raa">
          <name>DRIP RAA Allocations</name>
          <t>This document requests a new registry for RAA Allocations under the <eref target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/drip/drip.xhtml">DRIP registry group</eref> to be managed by IANA.</t>
          <dl>
            <dt>RAA Allocations:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>a 14-bit value used to represent RAAs. Future additions to this registry are to be made through Expert Review (Section 4.5 of <xref target="RFC8126"/>). The following values/ranges are defined:</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
          <table>
            <thead>
              <tr>
                <th align="left">RAA Value(s)</th>
                <th align="left">Status</th>
                <th align="left">Allocation</th>
                <th align="left">Reference</th>
              </tr>
            </thead>
            <tbody>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">0 - 3</td>
                <td align="left">Reserved</td>
                <td align="left">N/A</td>
                <td align="left">N/A</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">4 - 3999</td>
                <td align="left">Allocated</td>
                <td align="left">ISO 3166-1 Countries</td>
                <td align="left">This RFC</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">4000 - 16375</td>
                <td align="left">Reserved</td>
                <td align="left">N/A</td>
                <td align="left">N/A</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">16376 - 16383</td>
                <td align="left">Allocated</td>
                <td align="left">DRIP WG (Experimental Use)</td>
                <td align="left">This RFC</td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
          <t>To support DNS delegation in <tt>ip6.arpa</tt> a single RAA is given 4 delegations by borrowing the upper two bits of HDA space. This enables a clean nibble boundary in DNS to delegate from (i.e. the prefix <tt>2001:3x:xxx0::/44</tt>). These HDAs (0, 4096, 8192 and 12288) are reserved for the RAA.</t>
          <t>The mapping between ISO 3166-1 Numeric Numbers and RAAs can be found as a CSV file on <eref target="https://github.com/ietf-wg-drip/draft-ietf-drip-registries/blob/main/iso3166-raa.csv">GitHub</eref>. Each Nation is assigned four RAAs that are left to the national authority for their purpose. For RAAs under this range a shorter prefix of <tt>2001:3x:xx00::/40</tt> MAY be delegated to each CAA, which covers all 4 RAAs (and reserved HDAs) assigned to them.</t>
          <t>Requests in the DRIP WG allocation block MUST be forwarded to the contact point in the DRIP WG to evaluate the request and MUST contain a desired/proposed length of time for the allocation. Allocations in the block are not permanent and have a limited time the delegation is to be supported. The length of the time proposed is evaluated on a case-by-case basis by the DRIP WG and can result in negotiations for adjustment.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="iana-hhit-type">
          <name>HHIT Entity Type</name>
          <t>This document requests a new registry for HHIT Entity Type under the <eref target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/drip/drip.xhtml">DRIP registry group</eref>.</t>
          <dl>
            <dt>HHIT Entity Type:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>numeric, 16-bit, field of the HHIT RRType to encode the HHIT Entity Type. Future additions to this registry are to be made through Expert Review (Section 4.5 of <xref target="RFC8126"/>). The following values are defined:</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
          <table>
            <thead>
              <tr>
                <th align="left">Value</th>
                <th align="left">Type</th>
                <th align="left">Reference</th>
              </tr>
            </thead>
            <tbody>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">0</td>
                <td align="left">Not Defined</td>
                <td align="left">This RFC</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">1</td>
                <td align="left">DRIP Identity Management Entity (DIME)</td>
                <td align="left">This RFC</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">2</td>
                <td align="left">DIME: Authentication CA</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="drip-dki"/></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">3</td>
                <td align="left">DIME: Issuing CA</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="drip-dki"/></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">4</td>
                <td align="left">Reserved</td>
                <td align="left">This RFC</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">5</td>
                <td align="left">Apex</td>
                <td align="left">This RFC</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">6</td>
                <td align="left">Apex: Authentication CA</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="drip-dki"/></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">7</td>
                <td align="left">Apex: Issuing CA</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="drip-dki"/></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">8</td>
                <td align="left">Reserved</td>
                <td align="left">This RFC</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">9</td>
                <td align="left">Registered Assigning Authority (RAA)</td>
                <td align="left">This RFC</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">10</td>
                <td align="left">RAA: Authentication CA</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="drip-dki"/></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">11</td>
                <td align="left">RAA: Issuing CA</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="drip-dki"/></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">12</td>
                <td align="left">Reserved</td>
                <td align="left">This RFC</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">13</td>
                <td align="left">HHIT Domain Authority (HDA)</td>
                <td align="left">This RFC</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">14</td>
                <td align="left">HDA: Authentication CA</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="drip-dki"/></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">15</td>
                <td align="left">HDA: Issuing CA</td>
                <td align="left">
                  <xref target="drip-dki"/></td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">16</td>
                <td align="left">Uncrewed Aircraft (UA)</td>
                <td align="left">This RFC</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">17</td>
                <td align="left">Ground Control Station (GCS)</td>
                <td align="left">This RFC</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">18</td>
                <td align="left">Uncrewed Aircraft System (UAS)</td>
                <td align="left">This RFC</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">19</td>
                <td align="left">Remote Identification (RID) Module</td>
                <td align="left">This RFC</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">20</td>
                <td align="left">Pilot</td>
                <td align="left">This RFC</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">21</td>
                <td align="left">Operator</td>
                <td align="left">This RFC</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">22</td>
                <td align="left">Discovery &amp; Synchronization Service (DSS)</td>
                <td align="left">This RFC</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">23</td>
                <td align="left">UAS Service Supplier (USS)</td>
                <td align="left">This RFC</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">24</td>
                <td align="left">Network RID Service Provider (SP)</td>
                <td align="left">This RFC</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">25</td>
                <td align="left">Network RID Display Provider (DP)</td>
                <td align="left">This RFC</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">26</td>
                <td align="left">Supplemental Data Service Provider (SDSP)</td>
                <td align="left">This RFC</td>
              </tr>
              <tr>
                <td align="left">27 - 65535</td>
                <td align="left">Reserved</td>
                <td align="left">N/A</td>
              </tr>
            </tbody>
          </table>
          <t>Future additions to this registry MUST NOT be allowed if they can be covered under an existing registration.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <section anchor="dns-operational-considerations">
        <name>DNS Operational Considerations</name>
        <t>The Registrar and Registry are commonly used concepts in the DNS. These components interface the DIME into the DNS hierarchy and thus operation SHOULD follow best common practices, specifically in security (such as running DNSSEC) as appropriate. The following RFC provide suitable guidance: <xref target="RFC7720"/>, <xref target="RFC4033"/>, <xref target="RFC4034"/>, <xref target="RFC4035"/>, <xref target="RFC5155"/>, <xref target="RFC8945"/>, <xref target="RFC2182"/>, <xref target="RFC4786"/>, <xref target="RFC3007"/>.</t>
        <t>If DNSSEC is used, a DNSSEC Practice Statement (DPS) SHOULD be developed and published. It SHOULD explain how DNSSEC has been deployed and what security measures are in place. <xref target="RFC6841"/> documents a Framework for DNSSEC Policies and DNSSEC Practice Statements.</t>
        <t>The interfaces and protocol specifications for registry-registrar interactions are intentionally not specified in this document. These will depend on nationally defined policy and prevailing local circumstances. It is expected registry-registrar activity will use the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) <xref target="RFC5730"/>. The registry SHOULD provide a lookup service such as WHOIS <xref target="RFC3912"/> or RDAP <xref target="RFC9082"/> to provide public information about registered domain names.</t>
        <t>Decisions about DNS or registry best practices and other operational matters SHOULD be made by the CAA, ideally in consultation with local stakeholders. This document RECOMMENDS that DNSSEC SHOULD be used by both Apex (to control RAA levels) and RAA (to control HDA level) zones.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="public-key-exposure">
        <name>Public Key Exposure</name>
        <t>DETs are built upon asymmetric keys. As such the public key must be revealed to enable clients to perform signature verifications. <xref target="RFC9374"/> security considerations cover various attacks on such keys.</t>
        <t>While unlikely the forging of a corresponding private key is possible if given enough time (and computational power). As such it is RECOMMENDED that the public key for any DET not be exposed in DNS (under any RRType) until it is required.</t>
        <t>Optimally this requires the UAS somehow signal the DIME that a flight using a Specific Session ID will soon be underway or complete. It may also be facilitated under UTM if the USS (which may or may not be a DIME) signals when a given operation using a Session ID goes active.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="contributors">
      <name>Contributors</name>
      <t>Thanks to Stuart Card (AX Enterprize, LLC) and Bob Moskowitz (HTT Consulting, LLC) for their early work on the DRIP registries concept. Their early contributions laid the foundations for the content and processes of this architecture and document.</t>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references anchor="sec-combined-references">
      <name>References</name>
      <references anchor="sec-normative-references">
        <name>Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC9153">
          <front>
            <title>Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Requirements and Terminology</title>
            <author fullname="S. Card" initials="S." role="editor" surname="Card"/>
            <author fullname="A. Wiethuechter" initials="A." surname="Wiethuechter"/>
            <author fullname="R. Moskowitz" initials="R." surname="Moskowitz"/>
            <author fullname="A. Gurtov" initials="A." surname="Gurtov"/>
            <date month="February" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document defines terminology and requirements for solutions produced by the Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Working Group. These solutions will support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID) for security, safety, and other purposes (e.g., initiation of identity-based network sessions supporting UAS applications). DRIP will facilitate use of existing Internet resources to support RID and to enable enhanced related services, and it will enable online and offline verification that RID information is trustworthy.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9153"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9153"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9374">
          <front>
            <title>DRIP Entity Tag (DET) for Unmanned Aircraft System Remote ID (UAS RID)</title>
            <author fullname="R. Moskowitz" initials="R." surname="Moskowitz"/>
            <author fullname="S. Card" initials="S." surname="Card"/>
            <author fullname="A. Wiethuechter" initials="A." surname="Wiethuechter"/>
            <author fullname="A. Gurtov" initials="A." surname="Gurtov"/>
            <date month="March" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the use of Hierarchical Host Identity Tags (HHITs) as self-asserting IPv6 addresses, which makes them trustable identifiers for use in Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification (UAS RID) and tracking.</t>
              <t>Within the context of RID, HHITs will be called DRIP Entity Tags (DETs). HHITs provide claims to the included explicit hierarchy that provides registry (via, for example, DNS, RDAP) discovery for third-party identifier endorsement.</t>
              <t>This document updates RFCs 7401 and 7343.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9374"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9374"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9434">
          <front>
            <title>Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Architecture</title>
            <author fullname="S. Card" initials="S." surname="Card"/>
            <author fullname="A. Wiethuechter" initials="A." surname="Wiethuechter"/>
            <author fullname="R. Moskowitz" initials="R." surname="Moskowitz"/>
            <author fullname="S. Zhao" initials="S." role="editor" surname="Zhao"/>
            <author fullname="A. Gurtov" initials="A." surname="Gurtov"/>
            <date month="July" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes an architecture for protocols and services to support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID), plus UAS-RID-related communications. This architecture adheres to the requirements listed in the Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Requirements document (RFC 9153).</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9434"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9434"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references anchor="sec-informative-references">
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="drip-dki">
          <front>
            <title>The DRIP DET public Key Infrastructure</title>
            <author fullname="Robert Moskowitz" initials="R." surname="Moskowitz">
              <organization>HTT Consulting</organization>
            </author>
            <author fullname="Stuart W. Card" initials="S. W." surname="Card">
              <organization>AX Enterprize, LLC</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="23" month="October" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   The DRIP Entity Tag (DET) public Key Infrastructure (DKI) is a
   specific variant of classic Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) where
   the organization is around the DET, in place of X.520 Distinguished
   Names.  Further, the DKI uses DRIP Endorsements in place of X.509
   certificates for establishing trust within the DKI.

   There are two X.509 profiles for shadow PKI behind the DKI, with many
   of their X.509 fields mirroring content in the DRIP Endorsements.
   This PKI can at times be used where X.509 is expected and non-
   constrained communication links are available that can handle their
   larger size.

   C509 (CBOR) encoding of all X.509 certificates are also provided as
   an alternative for where there are gains in reduced object size.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-moskowitz-drip-dki-09"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="uas-sn-dns">
          <front>
            <title>UAS Serial Numbers in DNS</title>
            <author fullname="Adam Wiethuechter" initials="A." surname="Wiethuechter">
              <organization>AX Enterprize, LLC</organization>
            </author>
            <date day="25" month="June" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document describes a way Uncrewed Aerial System (UAS) Serial
   Numbers are placed into and retrieved from the Domain Name System
   (DNS).  This is to directly support DRIP-based Serial Numbers.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-wiethuechter-drip-uas-sn-dns-02"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5730">
          <front>
            <title>Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)</title>
            <author fullname="S. Hollenbeck" initials="S." surname="Hollenbeck"/>
            <date month="August" year="2009"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes an application-layer client-server protocol for the provisioning and management of objects stored in a shared central repository. Specified in XML, the protocol defines generic object management operations and an extensible framework that maps protocol operations to objects. This document includes a protocol specification, an object mapping template, and an XML media type registration. This document obsoletes RFC 4930. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="69"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5730"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5730"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6841">
          <front>
            <title>A Framework for DNSSEC Policies and DNSSEC Practice Statements</title>
            <author fullname="F. Ljunggren" initials="F." surname="Ljunggren"/>
            <author fullname="AM. Eklund Lowinder" initials="AM." surname="Eklund Lowinder"/>
            <author fullname="T. Okubo" initials="T." surname="Okubo"/>
            <date month="January" year="2013"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document presents a framework to assist writers of DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) Policies and DNSSEC Practice Statements, such as domain managers and zone operators on both the top level and secondary level, who are managing and operating a DNS zone with Security Extensions implemented.</t>
              <t>In particular, the framework provides a comprehensive list of topics that should be considered for inclusion into a DNSSEC Policy definition and Practice Statement. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6841"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6841"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8126">
          <front>
            <title>Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs</title>
            <author fullname="M. Cotton" initials="M." surname="Cotton"/>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <author fullname="T. Narten" initials="T." surname="Narten"/>
            <date month="June" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Many protocols make use of points of extensibility that use constants to identify various protocol parameters. To ensure that the values in these fields do not have conflicting uses and to promote interoperability, their allocations are often coordinated by a central record keeper. For IETF protocols, that role is filled by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).</t>
              <t>To make assignments in a given registry prudently, guidance describing the conditions under which new values should be assigned, as well as when and how modifications to existing values can be made, is needed. This document defines a framework for the documentation of these guidelines by specification authors, in order to assure that the provided guidance for the IANA Considerations is clear and addresses the various issues that are likely in the operation of a registry.</t>
              <t>This is the third edition of this document; it obsoletes RFC 5226.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="26"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8126"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8126"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8610">
          <front>
            <title>Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures</title>
            <author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
            <author fullname="C. Vigano" initials="C." surname="Vigano"/>
            <author fullname="C. Bormann" initials="C." surname="Bormann"/>
            <date month="June" year="2019"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document proposes a notational convention to express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) data structures (RFC 7049). Its main goal is to provide an easy and unambiguous way to express structures for protocol messages and data formats that use CBOR or JSON.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8610"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8610"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9082">
          <front>
            <title>Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Query Format</title>
            <author fullname="S. Hollenbeck" initials="S." surname="Hollenbeck"/>
            <author fullname="A. Newton" initials="A." surname="Newton"/>
            <date month="June" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes uniform patterns to construct HTTP URLs that may be used to retrieve registration information from registries (including both Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) and Domain Name Registries (DNRs)) using "RESTful" web access patterns. These uniform patterns define the query syntax for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP). This document obsoletes RFC 7482.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="95"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9082"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9082"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9575">
          <front>
            <title>DRIP Entity Tag (DET) Authentication Formats and Protocols for Broadcast Remote Identification (RID)</title>
            <author fullname="A. Wiethuechter" initials="A." role="editor" surname="Wiethuechter"/>
            <author fullname="S. Card" initials="S." surname="Card"/>
            <author fullname="R. Moskowitz" initials="R." surname="Moskowitz"/>
            <date month="June" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP), plus trust policies and periodic access to registries, augments Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Remote Identification (RID), enabling local real-time assessment of trustworthiness of received RID messages and observed UAS, even by Observers lacking Internet access. This document defines DRIP message types and formats to be sent in Broadcast RID Authentication Messages to verify that attached and recently detached messages were signed by the registered owner of the DRIP Entity Tag (DET) claimed.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9575"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9575"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4033">
          <front>
            <title>DNS Security Introduction and Requirements</title>
            <author fullname="R. Arends" initials="R." surname="Arends"/>
            <author fullname="R. Austein" initials="R." surname="Austein"/>
            <author fullname="M. Larson" initials="M." surname="Larson"/>
            <author fullname="D. Massey" initials="D." surname="Massey"/>
            <author fullname="S. Rose" initials="S." surname="Rose"/>
            <date month="March" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) add data origin authentication and data integrity to the Domain Name System. This document introduces these extensions and describes their capabilities and limitations. This document also discusses the services that the DNS security extensions do and do not provide. Last, this document describes the interrelationships between the documents that collectively describe DNSSEC. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4033"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4033"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5155">
          <front>
            <title>DNS Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of Existence</title>
            <author fullname="B. Laurie" initials="B." surname="Laurie"/>
            <author fullname="G. Sisson" initials="G." surname="Sisson"/>
            <author fullname="R. Arends" initials="R." surname="Arends"/>
            <author fullname="D. Blacka" initials="D." surname="Blacka"/>
            <date month="March" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Extensions introduced the NSEC resource record (RR) for authenticated denial of existence. This document introduces an alternative resource record, NSEC3, which similarly provides authenticated denial of existence. However, it also provides measures against zone enumeration and permits gradual expansion of delegation-centric zones. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5155"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5155"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8945">
          <front>
            <title>Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG)</title>
            <author fullname="F. Dupont" initials="F." surname="Dupont"/>
            <author fullname="S. Morris" initials="S." surname="Morris"/>
            <author fullname="P. Vixie" initials="P." surname="Vixie"/>
            <author fullname="D. Eastlake 3rd" initials="D." surname="Eastlake 3rd"/>
            <author fullname="O. Gudmundsson" initials="O." surname="Gudmundsson"/>
            <author fullname="B. Wellington" initials="B." surname="Wellington"/>
            <date month="November" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes a protocol for transaction-level authentication using shared secrets and one-way hashing. It can be used to authenticate dynamic updates to a DNS zone as coming from an approved client or to authenticate responses as coming from an approved name server.</t>
              <t>No recommendation is made here for distributing the shared secrets; it is expected that a network administrator will statically configure name servers and clients using some out-of-band mechanism.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFCs 2845 and 4635.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="93"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8945"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8945"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4034">
          <front>
            <title>Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions</title>
            <author fullname="R. Arends" initials="R." surname="Arends"/>
            <author fullname="R. Austein" initials="R." surname="Austein"/>
            <author fullname="M. Larson" initials="M." surname="Larson"/>
            <author fullname="D. Massey" initials="D." surname="Massey"/>
            <author fullname="S. Rose" initials="S." surname="Rose"/>
            <date month="March" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document is part of a family of documents that describe the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC). The DNS Security Extensions are a collection of resource records and protocol modifications that provide source authentication for the DNS. This document defines the public key (DNSKEY), delegation signer (DS), resource record digital signature (RRSIG), and authenticated denial of existence (NSEC) resource records. The purpose and format of each resource record is described in detail, and an example of each resource record is given.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 2535 and incorporates changes from all updates to RFC 2535. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4034"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4034"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4035">
          <front>
            <title>Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions</title>
            <author fullname="R. Arends" initials="R." surname="Arends"/>
            <author fullname="R. Austein" initials="R." surname="Austein"/>
            <author fullname="M. Larson" initials="M." surname="Larson"/>
            <author fullname="D. Massey" initials="D." surname="Massey"/>
            <author fullname="S. Rose" initials="S." surname="Rose"/>
            <date month="March" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document is part of a family of documents that describe the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC). The DNS Security Extensions are a collection of new resource records and protocol modifications that add data origin authentication and data integrity to the DNS. This document describes the DNSSEC protocol modifications. This document defines the concept of a signed zone, along with the requirements for serving and resolving by using DNSSEC. These techniques allow a security-aware resolver to authenticate both DNS resource records and authoritative DNS error indications.</t>
              <t>This document obsoletes RFC 2535 and incorporates changes from all updates to RFC 2535. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4035"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4035"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3007">
          <front>
            <title>Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic Update</title>
            <author fullname="B. Wellington" initials="B." surname="Wellington"/>
            <date month="November" year="2000"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document proposes a method for performing secure Domain Name System (DNS) dynamic updates. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3007"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3007"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2182">
          <front>
            <title>Selection and Operation of Secondary DNS Servers</title>
            <author fullname="R. Elz" initials="R." surname="Elz"/>
            <author fullname="R. Bush" initials="R." surname="Bush"/>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <author fullname="M. Patton" initials="M." surname="Patton"/>
            <date month="July" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document discusses the selection of secondary servers for DNS zones.The number of servers appropriate for a zone is also discussed, and some general secondary server maintenance issues considered. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="16"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2182"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2182"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7720">
          <front>
            <title>DNS Root Name Service Protocol and Deployment Requirements</title>
            <author fullname="M. Blanchet" initials="M." surname="Blanchet"/>
            <author fullname="L-J. Liman" surname="L-J. Liman"/>
            <date month="December" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The DNS root name service is a critical part of the Internet architecture. The protocol and deployment requirements for the DNS root name service are defined in this document. Operational requirements are out of scope.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="40"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7720"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7720"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3912">
          <front>
            <title>WHOIS Protocol Specification</title>
            <author fullname="L. Daigle" initials="L." surname="Daigle"/>
            <date month="September" year="2004"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document updates the specification of the WHOIS protocol, thereby obsoleting RFC 954. The update is intended to remove the material from RFC 954 that does not have to do with the on-the-wire protocol, and is no longer applicable in today's Internet. This document does not attempt to change or update the protocol per se, or document other uses of the protocol that have come into existence since the publication of RFC 954. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3912"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3912"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4786">
          <front>
            <title>Operation of Anycast Services</title>
            <author fullname="J. Abley" initials="J." surname="Abley"/>
            <author fullname="K. Lindqvist" initials="K." surname="Lindqvist"/>
            <date month="December" year="2006"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>As the Internet has grown, and as systems and networked services within enterprises have become more pervasive, many services with high availability requirements have emerged. These requirements have increased the demands on the reliability of the infrastructure on which those services rely.</t>
              <t>Various techniques have been employed to increase the availability of services deployed on the Internet. This document presents commentary and recommendations for distribution of services using anycast. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="126"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4786"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4786"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="F3411" target="https://www.astm.org/f3411-22a.html">
          <front>
            <title>Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking</title>
            <author>
              <organization>ASTM International</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2022" month="July"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="ASTM" value="F3411-22A"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1520/F3411-22A"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="ISO3166-1" target="https://www.iso.org/iso-3166-country-codes.html">
          <front>
            <title>Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions</title>
            <author>
              <organization>International Standards Organization (ISO)</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2020" month="August"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="ISO" value="3166-1:2020"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
  </back>
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