]> Arm Limited

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Nordic Semiconductor

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Openchip & Software Technologies, S.L.

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Security SUIT Internet-Draft This document specifies cryptographic algorithm profiles to be used with the SUIT manifest (see draft-ietf-suit-manifest). These are the mandatory-to-implement algorithms to ensure interoperability.

Introduction This document specifies algorithm profiles for SUIT manifest parsers and authors to ensure better interoperability. These profiles apply specifically to a constrained node software update use case. Mandatory algorithms may change over time due to an evolving threat landscape. Algorithms are grouped into algorithm profiles to account for this. Profiles may be deprecated over time. SUIT will define five choices of Mandatory To Implement (MTI) profile specifically for constrained node software update. These profiles are: One Symmetric MTI profile Two "Current" Constrained Asymmetric MTI profiles Two "Current" AEAD Asymmetric MTI profiles One "Future" Constrained Asymmetric MTI profile At least one MTI algorithm in each category MUST be FIPS qualified. Because SUIT presents an asymmetric communication profile, where manifest authors have unlimited resources and manifest recipients have constrained resources, the requirements for Recipients and Authors are different. Recipients MAY choose which MTI profile they wish to implement. It is RECOMMENDED that they implement the "Future" Asymmetric MTI profile. Recipients MAY implement any number of other profiles. Recipients MAY choose not to implement an encryption algorithm if encrypted payloads will never be used. Authors MUST implement all MTI profiles. Authors MAY implement any number of other profiles. Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) is preferred over un-authenticated encryption. Where possible an AEAD profile SHOULD be selected. Certain constrained IoT applications require on-the-fly decryption, which necessitates a non-AEAD encryption algorithm. If the application is not a constrained device, the two AEAD profiles are RECOMMENDED. Other use-cases of the SUIT Manifest () MAY define their own MTI algorithms.

Algorithms The algorithms that form a part of the profiles defined in this document are grouped into: Digest Algorithms Authentication Algorithms Key Exchange Algorithms (OPTIONAL) Encryption Algorithms (OPTIONAL)

Profiles Recognized profiles are defined below.

 Symmetric MTI profile: suit-sha256-hmac-a128kw-a128ctr Algorithm Type Algorithm COSE Key Digest SHA-256 -16 Authentication HMAC-256 5 Key Exchange A128KW Key Wrap -3 Encryption A128CTR -65534

Current Constrained Asymmetric MTI Profile 1: suit-sha256-es256-ecdh-a128ctr Algorithm Type Algorithm COSE Key Digest SHA-256 -16 Authentication ES256 -7 Key Exchange ECDH-ES + A128KW -29 Encryption A128CTR -65534

Current Constrained Asymmetric MTI Profile 2: suit-sha256-eddsa-ecdh-a128ctr Algorithm Type Algorithm COSE Key Digest SHA-256 -16 Authentication EDDSA -8 Key Exchange ECDH-ES + A128KW -29 Encryption A128CTR -65534

Current AEAD Asymmetric MTI Profile 1: suit-sha256-es256-ecdh-a128gcm Algorithm Type Algorithm COSE Key Digest SHA-256 -16 Authentication ES256 -7 Key Exchange ECDH-ES + A128KW -29 Encryption A128GCM 1

Current AEAD Asymmetric MTI Profile 2: suit-sha256-eddsa-ecdh-chacha-poly Algorithm Type Algorithm COSE Key Digest SHA-256 -16 Authentication EDDSA -8 Key Exchange ECDH-ES + A128KW -29 Encryption ChaCha20/Poly1305 24

Future Constrained Asymmetric MTI Profile 1: suit-sha256-hsslms-a256kw-a256ctr Algorithm Type Algorithm COSE Key Digest SHA-256 -16 Authentication HSS-LMS -46 Key Exchange A256KW -5 Encryption A256CTR -65532 This draft does not specify a particular set of HSS-LMS parameters. Deep trees are RECOMMENDED due to key lifetimes in IoT devices.

Reporting Profiles When using Manifest Recipients Response communication, particularly data structures that are designed for reporting of update capabilities, status, progress, or success, the same profile as the is used on the SUIT manifest SHOULD be used. There are cases where this is not possible, such as suit-sha256-hsslms-a256kw-a256ctr. In this case, the closest equivalent profile SHOULD be used, for example suit-sha256-es256-ecdh-a128ctr.

Security Considerations For the avoidance of doubt, there are scenarios where payload or manifest encryption are not required. In these scenarios, the encryption element of the selected profile is simply not used. AES-CTR mode is specified, see . All of the AES-CTR security considerations in apply. A non-AEAD encryption mode is specified in this draft due to the following mitigating circumstances: On-the-fly decryption (without the whole payload) must be supported. Therefore, there is no difference between AEAD and plaintext hash verification. Out-of-order decryption must be supported. Therefore, we must use a stream cipher that supports random access. Chosen plaintext attacks are extremely difficult to achieve, since the payloads are typically constructed in a relatively secure environment--the developer's computer or build infrastructure--and should be signed in an air-gapped or similarly protected environment. In short, the plaintext is authenticated prior to encryption. Content Encryption Keys must be used to encrypt only once. See . As a result of these mitigating circumstances, AES-CTR is an acceptable cipher for typical software/firmware delivery scenarios.

IANA Considerations IANA is requested to create a page for COSE Algorithm Profiles within the category for Software Update for the Internet of Things (SUIT) IANA is also requested to create a registry for COSE Alforithm Profiles within this page. The initial content of the registry is: Profile Status Digest Auth Key Exchange Encryption Descriptor Array Reference suit-sha256-hmac-a128kw-a128ctr MANDATORY -16 5 -3 -65534 [-16, 5, -3, -65534] suit-sha256-es256-ecdh-a128ctr MANDATORY -16 -7 -29 -65534 [-16, -7, -29, -65534] suit-sha256-eddsa-ecdh-a128ctr MANDATORY -16 -8 -29 -65534 [-16, -8, -29, -65534] suit-sha256-es256-ecdh-a128gcm MANDATORY -16 -7 -29 1 [-16, -7, -29, 1] suit-sha256-eddsa-ecdh-chacha-poly MANDATORY -16 -8 -29 24 [-16, -8, -29, 24] suit-sha256-hsslms-a256kw-a256ctr MANDATORY -16 -46 -5 -65532 [-16, -46, -5, -65532] New entries to this registry require standards action.

Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need for the ability to have basic security services defined for this data format. This document defines the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol. This specification describes how to create and process signatures, message authentication codes, and encryption using CBOR for serialization. This specification additionally describes how to represent cryptographic keys using CBOR. This document specifies the conventions for using the Hierarchical Signature System (HSS) / Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS) hash-based signature algorithm with the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) syntax. The HSS/LMS algorithm is one form of hash-based digital signature; it is described in RFC 8554. Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. There is a need to be able to define basic security services for this data format. This document defines the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) protocol. This specification describes how to create and process signatures, message authentication codes, and encryption using CBOR for serialization. This specification additionally describes how to represent cryptographic keys using CBOR. This document, along with RFC 9053, obsoletes RFC 8152. The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) data format is designed for small code size and small message size. CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) is specified in RFC 9052 to provide basic security services using the CBOR data format. This document specifies the conventions for using AES-CTR and AES-CBC as content encryption algorithms with COSE. Arm Limited Fraunhofer SIT Inria Nordic Semiconductor This specification describes the format of a manifest. A manifest is a bundle of metadata about code/data obtained by a recipient (chiefly the firmware for an Internet of Things (IoT) device), where to find the code/data, the devices to which it applies, and cryptographic information protecting the manifest. Software updates and Trusted Invocation both tend to use sequences of common operations, so the manifest encodes those sequences of operations, rather than declaring the metadata. University of Applied Sciences Bonn-Rhein-Sieg Vigil Security, LLC Arm Limited Linaro SECOM CO., LTD. This document specifies techniques for encrypting software, firmware, machine learning models, and personalization data by utilizing the IETF SUIT manifest. Key agreement is provided by ephemeral-static (ES) Diffie-Hellman (DH) and AES Key Wrap (AES-KW). ES-DH uses public key cryptography while AES-KW uses a pre-shared key. Encryption of the plaintext is accomplished with conventional symmetric key cryptography.

A. Full CDDL The following CDDL creates a subset of COSE for use with SUIT. Both tagged and untagged messages are defined. SUIT only uses tagged COSE messages, but untagged messages are also defined for use in protocols that share a ciphersuite with SUIT. To be valid, the following CDDL MUST have the COSE CDDL appended to it. The COSE CDDL can be obtained by following the directions in .

.and / COSE_Messages SUIT_COSE_Profile_ES256_ECDH_A128CTR = SUIT_COSE_Profile<-7,-65534> .and / COSE_Messages SUIT_COSE_Profile_EDDSA_ECDH_A128CTR = SUIT_COSE_Profile<-8,-65534> .and / COSE_Messages SUIT_COSE_Profile_ES256_ECDH_A128GCM = SUIT_COSE_Profile<-7,1> .and / COSE_Messages SUIT_COSE_Profile_EDDSA_ECDH_CHACHA20_POLY1304 = / SUIT_COSE_Profile<-8,24> .and COSE_Messages SUIT_COSE_Profile_HSSLMS_A256KW_A256CTR = / SUIT_COSE_Profile<-46,-65532> .and COSE_Messages SUIT_COSE_Profile = SUIT_COSE_Messages SUIT_COSE_Messages = / SUIT_COSE_Untagged_Message / SUIT_COSE_Tagged_Message SUIT_COSE_Untagged_Message = SUIT_COSE_Sign / SUIT_COSE_Sign1 / SUIT_COSE_Encrypt / SUIT_COSE_Encrypt0 / SUIT_COSE_Mac / SUIT_COSE_Mac0 SUIT_COSE_Tagged_Message = SUIT_COSE_Sign_Tagged / SUIT_COSE_Sign1_Tagged / SUIT_COSE_Encrypt_Tagged / SUIT_COSE_Encrypt0_Tagged / SUIT_COSE_Mac_Tagged / SUIT_COSE_Mac0_Tagged ; Note: This is not the same definition as is used in COSE. ; It restricts a COSE header definition further without ; repeating the COSE definition. It should be merged ; with COSE by using the CDDL .and operator. SUIT_COSE_Profile_Headers = ( protected : bstr .cbor SUIT_COSE_alg_map, unprotected : SUIT_COSE_header_map ) SUIT_COSE_alg_map = { 1 => algid, * int => any } SUIT_COSE_header_map = { * int => any } SUIT_COSE_Sign_Tagged = #6.98(SUIT_COSE_Sign) SUIT_COSE_Sign = [ SUIT_COSE_Profile_Headers, payload : bstr / nil, signatures : [+ SUIT_COSE_Signature] ] SUIT_COSE_Signature = [ SUIT_COSE_Profile_Headers, signature : bstr ] SUIT_COSE_Sign1_Tagged = #6.18(SUIT_COSE_Sign1) SUIT_COSE_Sign1 = [ SUIT_COSE_Profile_Headers, payload : bstr / nil, signature : bstr ] SUIT_COSE_Encrypt_Tagged = #6.96(SUIT_COSE_Encrypt) SUIT_COSE_Encrypt = [ SUIT_COSE_Profile_Headers, ciphertext : bstr / nil, recipients : [+SUIT_COSE_recipient] ] SUIT_COSE_recipient = [ SUIT_COSE_Profile_Headers, ciphertext : bstr / nil, ? recipients : [+SUIT_COSE_recipient] ] SUIT_COSE_Encrypt0_Tagged = #6.16(SUIT_COSE_Encrypt0) SUIT_COSE_Encrypt0 = [ SUIT_COSE_Profile_Headers, ciphertext : bstr / nil, ] SUIT_COSE_Mac_Tagged = #6.97(SUIT_COSE_Mac) SUIT_COSE_Mac = [ SUIT_COSE_Profile_Headers, payload : bstr / nil, tag : bstr, recipients :[+SUIT_COSE_recipient] ] SUIT_COSE_Mac0_Tagged = #6.17(SUIT_COSE_Mac0) SUIT_COSE_Mac0 = [ SUIT_COSE_Profile_Headers, payload : bstr / nil, tag : bstr, ] ]]>