]> ARTICLE 19

cfm@acm.org

This Internet-Draft is a submission to the IAB Workshop on Barriers to Internet Access of Services . About This Document Status information for this document may be found at . Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at .

Research proposal Between June 2022 and April 2023 , the Tor network was the target of a sustained distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, apparently targeting the relays and directory servers that coordinate introductions to Tor hidden services . This attack impeded the performance and threatened the security of the Tor network for all users. It especially obstructed Web sites and services that had gone out of their way to be accessible to Tor users via Tor hidden services, which usually improve the performance of the Tor network by bypassing the "exit nodes" that interface with the clearnet Internet. Although the origins and motivations of this attack remain unknown, it is a useful case study in the D/DoS vulnerability of overlay networks such as Tor, which users may seek out to protect their anonymity, circumvent censorship, or both. The CAP theorem is instructive: like a database, a censorship-circumvention system is useful to the extent that it is:

1. consistent: returns accurate and current data;
2. available: returns data at all; and
3. partition-tolerant: routes around failures, which by definition include active censorship. In this case, they also include active attacks on circumvention infrastructure that lessen its overall availability, whether or not intended as an act of censorship.

For the workshop, I propose to explore further whether formalisms such as the CAP theorem are useful models and/or measures for the utility and resilience of a censorship-circumvention system such as Tor.

Informative References Internet Architecture Board n.d. Tor Project